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PROSECUTORS AND MASS INCARCERATION 
 
94 USC LAW REVIEW __ (forthcoming 2021) 
 
     Shima Baradaran Baughman* and Megan S. Wright** 
 
It has long been postulated that America’s mass incarceration 
phenomenon is driven by increased drug arrests, draconian sentencing, 
and the growth of a prison industry. Yet among the major players—
legislators, judges, police, and prosecutors—one of these is shrouded in 
mystery. While laws on the books, judicial sentencing, and police arrests 
are all public and transparent, prosecutorial charging decisions are made 
behind closed doors with little oversight or public accountability. Indeed, 
without notice by commentators, during the last ten years or more, crime 
has fallen, and police have cut arrests accordingly, but prosecutors have 
actually increased the ratio of criminal court filings. Why? This Article 
presents quantitative and qualitative data from the first randomized 
controlled experiment studying how prosecutors nationally decide 
whether to charge a defendant. We find rampant variation and multiple 
charges for a single crime along with the lowest rates of declination in a 
national study. Crosscutting this empirical analysis is an exploration of 
Supreme Court and prosecutor standards that help guide prosecutorial 
decisions. This novel approach makes important discoveries about 
prosecutorial charging that are critical to understanding mass 
incarceration. 
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It is now rote to say that the U.S. incarcerates too many people.1 The U.S. has 
been the world leader in incarceration for decades,2 and will likely be for years to 
come.3  Even though many are aware of the problem, mass incarceration is not 
 
1 Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 811, 816 (2017) (“[The U.S.] keep[s] more people behind bars than the top 
thirty-five European countries combined, and our rate of incarceration dwarfs not only other 
Western allies but also countries like Russia and Iran.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and 
Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
1271, 1272 (2004) (“The sheer scale and acceleration of U.S. prison growth has no parallel 
in western society.”); Ian F. Haney López, Post Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and 
Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2010) (presenting 
numerical data establishing the U.S. incarceration rates as “the highest in the world, 
exceeding the highest rate in Europe by 500 percent”); Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Modern Day 
Scarlet Letter, 83 FORD. L. REV. 2999, 3000–01 (2015) (identifying mass incarceration, as 
“one of the most significant social problems” in the U.S.); Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil 
Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 
1803–04 (2012) (“[T]here has been an increase in both the rate of imprisonment and the 
absolute number of people in prison. That increase has been called unprecedented in the 
history of liberal democracy.”). 
2 The US incarceration rate quintupled from 1972 to its peak in 2007 (760 per 100,000). 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014); The 2017 
incarceration rate declined slightly to 698 per 100,000, with the U.S. still maintaining the 
highest incarceration rate in the world. Id. See also Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States 
of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (2018). 
3  Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 623, 627 (2006) (providing a brief articulation of the “exploding incarceration 
levels over the past two decades” within the U.S.); Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at 
Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L. REV. 423, 428 (2013) (noting the daily incarceration rate in the 
U.S. at 750 persons per 100,000). 
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improving any time soon. 4  The oft-repeated story is that the war on drugs, 5 
legislative sentencing practices, 6  or the growth of prisons has caused mass 
 
4  Haney López, supra note 2, at 1029 (“The invisibility of significant facets of 
continued nonwhite poverty and unemployment leads to false comfort . . . about social 
reform.”); Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy 
Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1695–97 (2006) (identifying several significant hurdles to 
carceral reform); Rachel E. Barkow, Three Lessons for Criminal Law Reformers from 
Locking Up Our Own, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1967 (2019) (articulating possible frameworks for 
criminal law reform that require sweeping cultural or systemic change subject to inconsistent 
factors such as voter approval, political approval, and the cultural climate); Donald Braman, 
Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and Reforming Criminal Sanctions in 
America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1183–85 (2006) (noting the significant differences in 
approach and opinion regarding reform); Sonja B. Starr, Evidenced-Based Sentencing and 
the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 870 (discussing a 
“politically palatable way to cut back on the United States’ sprawling system of mass 
incarceration”); Dylan Rodriguez, Abolition as Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2019) (“Contemporary reformist approaches to addressing the 
apparent overreach and scandalous excesses of the carceral state—characterized by calls to 
end ‘police brutality’ and ‘mass incarceration’—fail to recognize that the very logics of the 
overlapping criminal justice and policing regimes systemically perpetuate racial, sexual, 
gender, colonial, and class violence through carceral power.”); ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, 
MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING 41–44 (2018) (discussing the four fold increase in number of arrests for 
misdemeanors during Broken Windows Policing that did not increase convictions but rather, 
court congestion); HEATHER SCHOENFELD, BUILDING THE PRISON STATE: RACE AND THE 
POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION (2018) (discussing the “embrace of incarceration” that 
was politically incentivized).  
5 Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, A 25-Year Quagmire: The War on Drugs and Its Impact 
on American Society, SENT’G PROJECT 2 (2007) (identifying the carceral impact of the war 
on drugs); Rodriguez, supra note 4 (attributing the “2.3 million held captive by the state” as 
an unintended consequence of the war on drugs); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR 
OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 37, 39, 143 (2017) (discussing draconian 
drug sentences that disproportionately impacted minority defendants); MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR BLINDNESS 
60 (2012) (arguing that the war on drugs fueled by racism drove mass incarceration); MONA 
LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS: THE COERCIVE POWER OF DRUG LAWS IN FEDERAL COURT 
(demonstrating how the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 gave increased power to prosecutors 
to plea bargain in the federal context, increasing sentence lengths and the numbers of 
individuals prosecuted). 
6 Mauer & King, supra note 5, at 7–8 (describing how harsh sentencing laws from the 
1980s affected the federal Sentencing Guidelines resulting in more people incarcerated for 
longer periods of time); Kara Gotsch & Vinay Basti, Capitalization on Mass Incarceration 
U.S. Growth in Private Prisons, SENT’G PROJECT 5 (Aug. 2, 2018) (“The War on Drugs and 
harsher sentencing policies, including mandatory minimum sentences, fueled a rapid 
expansion in the nation’s prison population beginning in the 1980s.”); MICHAEL TONRY, 
SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORM IN AMERICA, 1975–2025, at vii (“No one admires 
American sentencing systems. They are arbitrary and unjust, they are much too severe, they 
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incarceration.7 These are all contributing causes. However, in the last ten years or 
more the number of crimes committed have decreased,8 the number of arrests per 
year have decreased consistently, 9  and while people are still serving long 
sentences,10 some federal sentences have been reduced.11  
An alternative explanation for the persistence of mass incarceration is 
prosecutor felony filing decisions since the 1980s.12 This explanation relies on an 
 
ruin countless lives, and they have produced a shameful system of mass incarceration.”). 
Also, those convicted of felonies in the United States are far more likely to be sentenced to 
prison and are sentenced to longer terms than similarly situated defendants in other countries. 
Id. at 12. 
7 SCHOENFELD, supra note 4, at 22 (“Prison capacity fueled the politics of crime not 
vice versa.”); Gotsch & Vinay, supra note 6, at 5–9 (illustrating the trend toward privatization 
of prisons in the U.S. through data); Private Prisons in the United States, SENT’G PROJECT 
(Oct. 24, 2019) (providing a brief two-page overview of the privatization of prisons in the 
U.S.); Adam Gopnik, How We Misunderstand Mass Incarceration, THE NEW YORKER (April 
3, 2017) (The prevailing theory of mass incarceration “insists that, first, the root cause of 
incarceration is the racist persecution of young black men for drug crimes, which 
overpopulates the prisons with nonviolent offenders. Then mandatory-sentencing laws leave 
offenders serving long prison sentences for relatively minor crimes. This hugely expanded 
prison population, one that tracks in reverse the decline of actual crime, has led to a 
commerce in caged men—private-prison contractors, and a specialized lobby in favor of 
prison construction, which in turn demands men to feed into the system.”).  
8 Shima B. Baughman, How Effective Are Police? The Problem of Clearance Rates and 
Criminal Accountability, 1 ALA. L. REV. __ (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=3566383 (providing data demonstrating that crime has gone down in America 
over the last thirty years). 
9 The number of arrests nationally have decreased since 2006. Baughman, supra note 
8 (comparing U.S. arrest rates noting the 1998 rate reached 25.72%, decreased in 2004 to 
21.98%, and has not yet risen back to the 1998 level). 
10 ALLEN J. BECK & ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, TRENDS IN U.S. INCARCERATION RATES: 
1980–2010 28 (2012) (finding that longer sentences increased prison admissions in the 1980s 
to 2010); see infra note 83 discussing Beckett and other studies; RACHEL E. BARKOW, 
PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION 17–18 (2019) 
(discussing the problem of long sentences, lack of support for rehabilitation and harsh 
collateral consequences). 
11 The First Step Act, S. 374, 115th Congress (2018); John F. Pfaff, The Myths and 
Realities of Correctional Severity: Evidence from the National Corrections Reporting 
Program on Sentencing Practices, FORDHAM LAW LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 
1338365, at 4, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1338365 (articulating the largely 
accepted view that prisoners are serving longer sentences while providing data demonstrating 
that “in many states, the median time served has declined over much of the 1990’s”). 
12 JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW 
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (Pfaff argues that in his 35-state sample, in 1994 about 
one of every three arrests turned into a felony case, and by the end of the 2000s, it was two 
out of every three arrests); John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic 
Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2013) (“At least since 1994, it 
appears that almost all the growth in prison populations has come from prosecutors’ 
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increase in number of felony filings by prosecutors.13 Misdemeanor filings have 
gone largely unnoticed from explanations of mass incarceration,14 and no one has 
analyzed data to see what impact these filings have had on mass incarceration. 
According to our analysis of national data, since 2003, prosecutor charging per arrest 
has actually gone up every year.15  In the face of both falling crime and public 
pressure to stop mass incarceration, prosecutors are not responding as readily as 
police, a point almost completely unnoticed by commentators.16  
Throughout criminal justice and maybe even across the law generally, the 
prosecutor may be the government official with the most unreviewable discretion.17 
 
decisions to file felony charges.”); John F. Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Admissions 
and Population, 1 (Jan. 23, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990508 (“[T]he growth in 
prison populations has been driven almost entirely by increases in felony filings per arrest.”). 
See also EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN 
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2019) (discussing prosecutors’ 
contributions to mass incarceration since the 1980s due to their “unfettered power” in 
charging bail, and claiming they are “not the only ones at fault” but “their decisions are the 
ones that matter most”). 
13 PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12 (following data starting in the 1990s through 2007 
demonstrating that increases in prosecutor charges filed track the growth in prison 
admissions); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 
1063 (2015) (comparing the 2.3 million felony cases filed every year in the U.S. to the 10 
million misdemeanor cases filed every year); KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 4, at 69 
(2018) (describing that in NY “Police made 251,000 misdemeanor arrests in 2010, up from 
the 65,000 misdemeanor arrests in 1980”; misdemeanor arrests nationwide increased four-
fold from 1980 to 2010) Id. at 42. 
14 By the 2010s, roughly half of all misdemeanor cases resulted in dismissal. Kohler-
Hausman points out that there are “more police, more arrests, and higher racial concentration, 
but lower conviction rates and jail sentences.” KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 4. Lower 
courts then decide to “manage” individuals, rather than decide whether they committed the 
crime. Id. at 70–72. See also ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME (2018) 
(arguing people are punished for misdemeanors long before they are convicted).  
15 See Part I.B. 
16 One regional news article comments on the trend of reduced crime but increased 
felony filings in Colorado, blaming drug addiction rather than a broader problem with 
prosecutors, see Allison Sherry, Prosecutors File a Record Number of Felonies Even as 
Colorado’s Crime Remains Flat, CPR NEWS (February 4, 2019). 
17 Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 
U. PA L. REV. 959, 959 (2009) (“No government official has as much unreviewable power 
or discretion as the prosecutor.”); Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 
101, (forthcoming 2020) (noting that “[s]cholars view prosecutors as “the most powerful 
officials in the criminal justice system,” and blame them for “[m]uch of what is wrong with 
American criminal justice.””); Angela Davis, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE 
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (2007); Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal 
Justice: Should Prosecutors Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 678 (2016) 
(“No serious observer disputes that prosecutors drive sentencing and hold most of the power 
in the United States criminal justice system.”); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion 
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Currently, the U.S. criminal legal system processes around 5 million felony and 12 
million misdemeanor cases each year.18 These cases are all in the hands of one 
criminal justice actor: a prosecutor. None of these arrests become cases unless a 
prosecutor makes a decision. Prosecutors decide whether to initiate criminal 
proceedings, what charges to bring, what penalties to seek, and when a plea bargain 
is appropriate.19 And since 94% of criminal cases are resolved by plea bargain, 
prosecutors, not judges, are determining a defendant’s fate the vast majority of the 
time.20  
Prosecutors can decide not to bring any charges at all,21 or drop any or all of 
the charges at any time.22 For instance, with misdemeanor cases, prosecutors decide 
to drop charges up to 80% of the time.23 However once a prosecutor charges a crime, 
 
in an Adversary System, BYU L. REV. 669, 672 (1992) (explaining that “[i]n exercising the 
charging function, the prosecutor enjoys broad, indeed virtually unlimited, discretion.”); 
Logan Sawyer, Reform Prosecutors and Separation of Powers, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 603, 610–
11 (2020) (noting that “there is very little formal oversight of the decisions prosecutors make 
outside of the courtroom—where their most important decisions are made.”); Kay Levine, 
The New Prosecution, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2005) (Prosecutors have “near 
total control over the decision of when and what to charge in a potential criminal case.”).  
18 There were 17.4 million cases filed in 2017. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 
STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST 2 (2017) (In 2017, based on data from 26 states, there were 
3.5 misdemeanor cases to every 1 felony case, or about 28.5% of cases are felonies and 
71.5% are misdemeanors. Id. Therefore, we are likely to see 5 million felonies filed and 
about 12.4 misdemeanors. Cf. Natapoff, Misdemeanor, supra note 13 at 1063 (estimating 
that misdemeanors comprise approximately 80 percent of most state dockets); KOHLER-
HAUSMANN, supra note 4, at 69 (estimating 13 million misdemeanor cases filed each year); 
NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT, supra note 14, at 251 (estimating the “total size of the 2015 US 
misdemeanor docket” at 13,240,034 criminal filings). 
19 See infra notes 94–104. 
20  See Felony Sentences in State Courts, Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS (2006). 
21 Steven W. Perry & Duren Banks, Prosecutors in State Courts (2007) – Statistical 
Tables, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS NCJ 234211, 8 tbl. 10, 9 fig. 3 (Dec. 2011) (relying 
on the 2007 Census of State Court Prosecutors, 47% of all state prosecutor office’s reported 
a declination to prosecute). 
22 Samuel J. Levine, The Potential Utility of Disciplinary Regulation as a Remedy for 
Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2017) 
(“[T]hrough the decision whether or not to file charges, the prosecutor determines if a 
particular individual will face the machinery of the criminal justice system, while other 
discretionary decisions, such as those relating to what charges to file and the terms of a plea 
bargain, have a substantial—and often determinative—effect on the outcome of a case.”); 
Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for Supervising Prosecutors: 
Applying the Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395, 399 (2009) (“Prosecutors can charge bargain, 
add, or subtract offenses in order to reach the prison sentence they desire.”). 
23 Shima B. Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 BOSTON U. L. REV. 837, 872 
(2018) (noting that misdemeanor violations are dismissed eighty percent of the time and 
ultimately result in no legal consequences). 
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the damage for a defendant is often done—even if charges are later dropped.24 A 
defendant with criminal charges often is detained pretrial and then has a criminal 
record, which may cause collateral consequences for life.25  Understanding how 
prosecutors make charging decisions is essential in determining the impact of 
charging on defendants as well as the underlying causes of mass incarceration. 
Hundreds of articles in recent years have been written about prosecutors.26 
Some have recently envisioned a more progressive prosecutor who refuses to charge 
cases and is focused on criminal justice reform. 27  There are many conflicting 
 
24 Anna Roberts, Arrest as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 997–1000 (2019) (discussing 
the ways in which people who are arrested are treated as guilty); Natapoff, Misdemeanor, 
supra note 13, at 1091 (“[p]olice are more likely to arrest an individual who has been arrested 
or charged before”). 
25 “The impacts of mass incarceration are not just prison numbers and families split 
apart, but increased numbers of people who cannot be productive members of society 
because they have a charge on their record. Even those who are not incarcerated (or leave 
jail after a short stint) are permanently excluded from much of public life because of their 
“record.” See SHIMA B. BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN 
AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2017); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 459 
(2010) (demonstrating the “various collateral consequences that attach to criminal 
convictions”); NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT supra note 14, n.168 (noting “over forty-five 
thousand collateral consequences of criminal conviction and infractions”). 
26 See e.g., supra note 17 and infra note 27–30; Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, 
Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the 
Effects of Booker, 123 YALE. L. J. 2, 6 (2013) (“The modern criminal justice process is 
prosecutor-dominated. Prosecutors have broad charging and plea-bargaining discretion, and 
their choices have a huge impact on sentences.”); Benjamin Levin, Imagining the 
Progressive Prosecutor, MINNESOTA L.J. 3 (forthcoming 2020) (describing different types 
of progressive prosecutors and their various areas of focus); Bellin, Theories, supra note 17, 
at 101 (articulating an alternative “servant-of-the-law” theory to govern prosecutors). See 
also Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public 
Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV. 589, 606 (2019) (“there is no established vocabulary for judging 
prosecutors’ exercise of discretion . . . .”); George C. Thomas, III, Discretion and Criminal 
Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Mundane, 109 PENN ST. L. REV 1043, 1058 (2005) (arguing 
that discretion is inevitable but that some kinds are more acceptable than others); Bennett L. 
Gershman, The Zealous Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 151 (2011); 
Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORD. URB. L. J. 607 (1999); 
Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted 
from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2009); Kenneth Bresler, Pretty 
Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1301 (1996); Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of 
Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and 
Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2016). 
27 W. Kerrel Murray, Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. __, 3 
(2020)(discussing prosecutors who refuse to charge cases in effect “nullifying” the law); 
Levin, supra note 26, at 3 (describing different types of progressive prosecutors and their 
various areas of focus); Bellin, Theories, supra note 17, at 103–04 (providing examples of 
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theoretical frameworks to understand prosecutors. 28  What has been lacking is 
empirical data to narrow the field of theories. The existing empirical data is 
localized, often dated, and not nationally representative.29 Even worse, the archival 
data does not include the key variables of interest, which would be the granular facts 
of the cases, as presented to prosecutors. Accordingly, we cannot understand what 
 
prosecutors across the nation whose acts depict them as “representatives of a national 
movement to leverage prosecutorial power to achieve criminal justice reform”); Levine, 
supra note 17, at 1127–29 (Prosecutor as head “problem solver” involves counseling of 
defendants, not just acting as an advocate, and working on crime reduction and other 
nontraditional tasks to improve criminal justice); Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 307 (2001) (concluding that “prosecutorial discretion requires 
public moral judgement” over theories of legal or personal moral judgment); M. ELAINE 
NUGENT-BORAKOVE, Performance Measures and Accountability, in THE CHANGING ROLE 
OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 93–94 (2008) (outlining some prosecutorial theories as well 
as five types of prosecutors and their respective goals/objectives); Bruce A. Green & 
Rebecca Roiphe, When Prosecutors Politick: Progressive Law Enforcers Then and Now, J. 
OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMIN. 2 (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3596249 
(comparing “the new progressive prosecutors to the Progressive Era criminal justice 
reformers in order to identify the benefits and concerns that accompany a prosecutorial 
reform movement linked to popular politics”). 
28 See e.g., William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1891–93 
(2000) (arguing that the reason for the difference between the public and prosecutorial 
interest is that individual prosecutors do not reflect on the impact of their decisions); R. 
Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice: A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Support 
Sentencing Reform, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 4, 101 (2014) (“[O]ther authors have explored the 
tensions between a prosecutor’s adversarial duties and ‘minister of justice’ role . . . few have 
explored what it means to be an ‘administer of justice’ in the wider political arena”); Roger 
A. Fairfax, Jr., The “Smart on Crime” Prosecutor, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905, 906 (2012) 
(highlighting the “smart on crime” movement for prosecutors focusing on fairness and 
accuracy, reducing recidivism, crime prevention, transition out of prison, and cost); K. Babe 
Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal 
Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 287 (2014) (“[C]all[ing] upon prosecutors to 
exercise their discretion to decline to prosecute minor offenses where arrest patterns show a 
disparate impact on racial minorities . . . .”). 
29  See infra note 135, 137. But see J. Mark Ramseyer et al., Convictions Versus 
Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for 
Law, Economics and Business Discussion paper Series Paper 611, 23–26 (Feb. 21, 2008) 
(studying the effects of prosecutors’ case selection and conviction rates using SCPS 1990-
2002 felony defendants in large urban counties; and testing two models of prosecutorial 
behavior, one that balances the social planning goal against personal objectives and a goal 
of high conviction rates. The study revealed that conviction rates rise with budgets and are 
higher where prosecutors are elected rather than appointed. However, the study also revealed 
that overall prosecution rates do not have a clear correlation with budget increases, and that 
conviction rates are slightly lower in high-crime districts where the prosecution rate is 
higher). 
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might be happening with prosecutor charging—otherwise known as the “black box” 
of criminal justice.30  
Despite the importance of understanding prosecutor decisions, we have the 
answers to so few of the basic questions about how prosecutors make decisions. For 
instance, how many charges on average does a prosecutor charge for a single 
incident?31 How often do prosecutors decline to charge when they have evidence to 
do so?32 When do they impose a fine or incarcerate an individual? Under what 
circumstances, does a prosecutor charge a felony or misdemeanor? These are all 
basic charging questions every prosecutor answers every day. Without an 
understanding of how prosecutors make decisions, it is difficult to create a cogent 
theory to understand prosecutors or mass incarceration. 
The reason we know so little is because prosecutors are nearly impossible to 
study. They do not release information on how they make charging decisions, and 
often they do not even internally analyze these critical decisions. A review of 
empirical data on prosecutors demonstrates this problem. 33  Existing prosecutor 
studies do not provide answers to the basic charging questions that we most want to 
know about.34  
This Article studies prosecutor charging decisions both empirically and 
theoretically. The empirical backbone of this Article—our study about prosecutor 
decision making using a national sample of state prosecutors—questions the 
conventional wisdom of the root causes of mass incarceration. 35  Of particular 
interest is the prosecutors’ discretion in the initial charging decision, since this 
discretion may reduce the efficacy of upstream reforms such as reduced arrests or 
downstream policy changes like sentencing reform.36 This Article is able to explore 
 
30 Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125 (2008) 
(discussing the reasons for declinations by prosecutors in New Orleans). 
31 These questions can be answered with data, but this data is often neither collected 
nor released. 
32 We have national estimates on declination but we do not have information on whether 
a prosecutor declined to charge when they lacked appropriate evidence or because they felt 
that the crime did not warrant a charge. We also lack details on cases prosecutors declined 
to charge to learn about their thinking on declination. See infra notes 197-207. 
33 See infra Part I.B. 
34 See infra notes 134–38 for previous prosecutorial studies. 
35 Christopher Robertson, Shima Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Race and 
Class: A Randomized Experiment with Prosecutors, 16 J. EMPIR. LEGAL STUD. 807, 807–
847 (2019). (We completed data collection in 2017 and finished coding data in 2018.) 
36  Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and 
Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1602 (2012) (“[Sentencing] commissions could and 
should do more to address the relationship between guidelines and prosecutorial power . . . . 
Because some amount of prosecutorial discretion is necessary and inevitable, guidelines 
must account for that reality.”); Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing 
Reform: Establishing a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 
221 (2005) (“[O]ver the past two decades, sentencing authority has been transferred from 
judges through a politically weak Commission to Congress and, in the end, to prosecutors.”); 
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how prosecutors use discretion in the initial charging decision and whether they 
decide to punish an individual, and how much they decide to punish. This analysis 
suggests three important conclusions that challenge our understanding of 
prosecutors. First, prosecutors in our study charged defendants 97% of the time—
contradicting existing estimates that prosecutors decline up to 50% of cases. Second, 
prosecutors in our study recommended much harsher punishments than we 
anticipated—even though most prosecutors did not impose jail time, they charged 
an average of three crimes for a single incident and almost half recommended fines. 
Third, we found great disparity in prosecutorial decisions for the same hypothetical 
crime, which has important implications for defendant equity and proportionality in 
punishment. We compare all of these novel results with guidance from the Supreme 
Court and prosecutor standards. This statutory and caselaw analysis considers 
whether prosecutors are acting in accord with Court precedent and statutory dictates 
in their charging decisions. It also considers the role of prosecutorial discretion and 
transparency in our understanding of how prosecutors contribute to mass 
incarceration.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an in-depth background on 
prosecutor discretion and its impact on criminal justice. It also delves into the 
empirical debate on the prosecutorial role in mass incarceration and addresses 
limitations of previous prosecutorial research. Part II describes results from our 
study of prosecutor decision making in which real prosecutors were asked to review 
realistic but hypothetical cases and make charging decisions. Part III discusses more 
fully the decisions of prosecutors in light of the latest instructions from the Supreme 
Court and national prosecution guidelines. The concluding section provides some 
thoughts on balancing prosecutor discretion and transparency. 
 
I.  UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTOR DECISIONS 
 
 
Russell D. Covey, Rules, Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law, 104 CAL. L. REV. 
447, 483 (2016) (“When they are aware that mandatory-minimum sentencing provisions 
might require imposing onerous sentences even when mitigating facts exist, prosecutors 
might file less serious charges or drop prosecutions altogether to avoid what they consider 
to be unjustifiable results.”). In addition to trying to address mass incarceration, it is also 
important to test upstream policy remedies, such as blinding prosecutors to defendant race 
and class information, which may reduce biases in or increase perceived legitimacy of 
prosecutor decisions. Sunita Sah et al., Blinding Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race: A Policy 
Proposal to Reduce Unconscious Bias in the Criminal Justice System, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & 
POL’Y 69, 72 (2015) (arguing that one way to “manage bias is to acknowledge its existence 
and create institutional procedures to prevent bias from influencing important decisions”); 
Robertson et al., supra note 35, at 808 (examining how prosecutors use their “very broad 
discretion in the initial charging decision, since this discretion may reduce the efficacy of 
downstream policy reforms such as sentencing guidelines, which have been enacted to 
reduce disparities in outcomes”). 
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For many years the leading theory of mass incarceration has been the war on 
drugs and changes in sentencing.37 Later, scholars noticed the growth of prisons—
both public and private and the accompanying new motivations to fill prisons, as 
another contributing cause to mass incarceration.38 In recent years, John Pfaff and 
Emily Bazelon have both argued that prosecutors are primarily to blame for mass 
incarceration. 39  Relying on felony data from 1990 to 2007, Pfaff asserts that 
prosecutors have caused the epic mass incarceration problems by filing more 
felonies per prosecutor each year. This theory has been challenged prominently by 
two scholars.  
In this section we will briefly summarize Pfaff’s theory and his critics and also 
provide data beyond the years Pfaff provides it—considering what has happened 
with prosecutors in the last ten years. We analyze both felony and misdemeanor data 
and demonstrate that prosecutors have actually reduced the rates of crimes charged 
from 2003 until 2018. So instead of yearly increases in criminal charges by 
prosecutors, we have seen decreases each year in charging by prosecutors. However, 
given the decrease in crime rates over those same years and the 25% decrease in 
arrest rates, prosecutors have not decreased charging commensurately with arrest 
rates during this same period. Indeed, prosecutors have actually increased their ratio 
of criminal court filings. So, in essence, prosecutors present a formidable threat to 
cutting mass incarceration—not only with felony but misdemeanor filings. Part I.A 
discusses significant prosecutorial discretion. Part I.B delves into the prosecution 
data supporting mass incarceration; and Part I.C discusses previous empirical work 
on prosecutors. 
 
A.  Prosecutor Discretion 
 
Understanding who prosecutors are and how they make decisions is important 
to determining their role in mass incarceration. Prosecutors are government 
attorneys who represent the state in criminal cases and decide whether to charge 
after an arrest. 40  A prosecutor investigates and prosecutes criminal cases and 
provides advice regarding criminal matters.41  
 
37  See PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12 and BAZELON supra note 12 for books 
addressing this issue. 
38 PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12. 
39 Id. 
40  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE 
PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION 3-1.2(a) (4th ed. 2017) (hereinafter “ABA STANDARD”) (A 
prosecutor is an officer of the court and “an administrator of justice,[and] a zealous 
advocate”); Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 589, 608 (1985) (“So long as the prosecutor has probable 
cause . . . the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a 
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”). 
41 ABA STANDARD 3-1.1. 
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In their role as an advocate for the state, prosecutors have substantial 
discretion.42 What does this mean? Prosecutors decide whether to initiate criminal 
proceedings,43 what crimes to charge,44 or decline,45 how and when to prosecute the 
 
42  Wesley MacNeil Oliver & Rishi Batra, Standards of Legitimacy in Criminal 
Negotiations, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 67 (2015) (“Prosecutors possess extraordinary 
power to charge defendants.”); Thomas, supra note 26, at 1043 (“Discretion in enforcement 
and prosecution of crime is inevitable.”); Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn’t 
Enough: Reinventing the Guidelines for Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
475, 475 (2007) (“[T]he discretion afforded prosecutors exists at every level of the criminal 
justice system, whether the defendant is Martha Stewart or the guy next door, and the impact 
on the defendant is substantially the same.”). 
43  Sarah Ribstein, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure on White-Collar 
Criminal Defendants, 58 DUKE L. J. 857, 868 (2009) (“Prosecutors in street-crime cases have 
a great deal of discretion as to whether or not to indict . . . .”); Robert L. Misner, Recasting 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 717, 773 (1996) (“[C]urrent prosecutorial 
discretion is virtually unlimited . . .”); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The 
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 49–50 (2002) (“Through deliberate 
choices about screening, a chief prosecutor can change the place of jury trials, the pattern of 
convictions and dismissals, the allocation of police and correctional resources, and the 
public’s access to information about the system.”). 
44  NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS 4-2.1 (3d Ed updated 2009) (hereinafter “NDAA Standards”) (“It is the ultimate 
responsibility of the prosecutor’s office to determine which criminal charges should be 
prosecuted and against whom.”); Nicole T. Amsler, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying 
Federal Corporate Charging Considerations to Individuals, 66 DUKE L. J. 169, 173 (2016) 
(“[T]he number of violations a federal prosecutor can choose from when charging someone 
with a crime is so enormous that it is essentially countless.”); Craig H. Solomon, 
Prosecutorial Vindictiveness: Divergent Lower Court Applications of the Due Process 
Prohibition, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 324 (1982) (“Prosecutors enjoy considerable 
discretion in deciding what charges, if any, to bring against a suspect.”). 
45 Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to 
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1700 (2010) (“And prosecutors have significant 
authority to decline charges for equitable reasons. . . , but their professional position leaves 
them overcautious. They have power, but they may lack will and perspective.”); Daniel C. 
Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of 
Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 605 (2005) (describing how crimes with 
consistent legal definitions cause prosecutors to enforce the crimes “as written” resulting in 
more systematic and aggressive enforcement). 
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charges, 46  what penalties to seek, 47  when to offer plea bargains, 48  and what 
sentencing recommendations to advise.49 Prosecutors can “freely choose” between 
 
46 See Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to 
Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 490 (2017) (“Prosecutorial discretion . . . refers to the 
power . . . to determine how, when and whether to initiate and pursue enforcement 
proceedings.”); Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court's Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: 
The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 599 (2014) (“[P]rosecutors 
can decide, almost without limit, to add additional charges or enhancements after the case 
has been filed, as long as the additions are at least arguably supported by the evidence.”). 
47 Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 84 
(2011) (“Prosecutors exercise sovereign authority when they determine who may be 
punished for legal transgressions and who will not.”); Shima B. Baughman, 
Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071, 1091 (2017) (“…prosecutors have 
the latitude to charge a wide range of crimes and to seek a wide range of penalties as long as 
the prosecutor believes the charges and sought-after penalties are ‘consistent with the nature 
of the defendant’s conduct’ or the likelihood of success at trial is high, without regard to the 
incarceration effect of the charges.”). 
48  Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of 
Discretion, 117 YALE L. J. 1420, 1470 (2008) (“Since prosecutorial discretion and plea 
bargains control most outcomes, the system as it actually operates relies on both the priorities 
and the judgments of prosecutors. The default is the plea bargain (or sentence bargain), with 
the adversarial jury trial serving as a kind of judicial review for defendants who are not 
content with administrative adjudication by the prosecutor.”); Jeffrey Standen, Plea 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (1993) (“As the 
sole ‘purchasers’ of criminal defendants’ convictions and incriminating information, 
prosecutors . . . possess substantial power to overwhelm criminal defendants in the plea 
bargaining process.”); Alkon, supra note 46, at 599 (“Prosecutors also have the power to 
decide not to make a plea offer. In effect, the prosecutors hold all the cards; defendants only 
have the power to throw a monkey wrench into the system by demanding a jury trial.”); 
Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GEO. L. REV. 407, 420–25 
(2008) (“Prosecutors can reassure defendants of their neutrality and trustworthiness by 
employing objective criteria in making plea bargaining decisions, explaining their decisions, 
and demonstrating consideration of defense arguments in favor of lenience . . . .”); Cynthia 
Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 107 (1994) (“The prosecutor may engage in 
plea negotiations with the defendant and may threaten increased charges should a defendant 
fail to accept the prosecutor’s plea offer.”). 
49 James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 
1521 (1981) (“The decisions [prosecutors] make determine in large part who will be 
convicted and what punishment will be imposed.”); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing 
Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 
1011 (2005) (“Prosecutors have become more powerful through the potent combination of 
far-reaching and duplicative criminal codes, relatively few resources available for trial, and 
nondiscretionary sentencing laws. While judges now find themselves increasingly 
accountable to the law of sentencing, prosecutors have accumulated new powers and 
encounter no new regulation of their authority.”). 
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charging options, and defendants are generally stuck with these choices. 50 
Prosecutors’ discretionary power is not unlimited as the scope of the power depends 
on statutes passed by legislatures.51 However, in most states criminal statutes are 
numerous and there are often more than enough options for criminal charging in 
every area.52  
The prosecutor may have more discretion than any government official.53 Most 
profoundly, when deciding whether to charge a case, the prosecutor brings the 
ultimate weight of the state down on the defendant.54 The constitutional checks that 
could exist on prosecutors do not typically exist.55 Judges and the public could pose 
 
50 Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 178–9, 184 (2019). 
(“Those who say prosecutors have a lot of power mean that prosecutors have the ability to 
freely choose between different options (i.e., discretion).”); Michael Tonry, Prosecutors and 
Politics in Comparative Perspective, 41 CRIME. & JUSTICE 5 (2012) (“Discretionary 
prosecutorial decisions are for all practical purposes immune from judicial review.”); see 
also Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 
840, 904 (noting that “prosecutors should make decisions based on articulable principles or 
subprinciples that command broad societal acceptance.” This idea poses a challenge because 
prosecutors have never attempted to identify workable norms for the array of discretionary 
decisions that prosecutors’ offices make every day. “This, then, is our main prescriptive 
point: each prosecutor’s office should attempt to articulate standards. Specific rules or 
criteria constraining prosecutorial decision-making cannot be formulated without first 
identifying fundamental governing norms. Although these norms need not be universally 
accepted, they should have some claim to public support). 
51 Bellin, Power, supra note 50, at 184 (finding that “all prosecutors’ . . . powers depend 
on an enforceable statute enacted by the legislature”) Federal prosecutors also have very little 
power over the vast number of criminal defendants who are adjudicated by state statutes.  
52 Baughman, Subconstitutional, supra note 47 (discussion of overcriminalization—too 
many statutes to choose from and more every year); see also Wright, supra note 49. 
53 Bibas, supra note 17 (“No government official has as much unreviewable power or 
discretion as the prosecutor.”). 
54 Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of 
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408 (2001) (noting the many facets of a prosecutor’s power 
to charge an individual, acknowledging this power as “arguably the most important power”). 
The United States has never ascribed to “mandatory prosecution,” which theoretically allows 
prosecutors the ability to decline to charge. Albert W. Alschuler, A Teetering Palladium?, 
79 JUDICATURE 200, 201 (1996) (“[T]he discretion of prosecutors . . . not to enforce the law 
is not only tolerated but applauded[.]”);Vorenberg, supra note 49, at 1551 (“[S]ome 
nonenforcement of the law will occur[.]”). 
55  Baughman, Subconstitutional, supra note 47, at 1071 (arguing that the lack of 
constitutional checks on prosecutors has had negative impacts on criminal law including 
increased filings and excessive plea bargaining, among others). There are some minimal 
constitutional limits. For example, prosecutors cannot engage in selective prosecution or 
vindictive prosecution. See, e.g., Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); Blackledge v. 
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28–29 (1974). 
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a check on prosecutors, but this is often not the case in the vast majority of cases.56 
Judges are usually unable to intervene on behalf of criminal defendants when it 
comes to severe or disparate charging.57 About 94% of criminal cases are resolved 
through plea-bargaining, which often takes place in private meetings, which the 
public cannot monitor. 58  Accordingly, elections are not the check that the 
constitution envisioned for prosecutors.59 
 
56  Jeffery Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass 
Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 849 (2018) (asserting that judges act as a check on 
prosecutors because they have the final say on sentencing decisions). But see Jenia Iontcheva 
Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 199–267 (arguing that judges are merely “passive verifier[s]” and have a minimal role in 
the plea bargain process); see also Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea 
Bargaining, 57 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 102 (2016) (discussing the diminished role of 
judges in plea bargaining). 
57 Lee, supra note 48, at 164 (“[C]ourts are reluctant to intervene when their own 
notions of what constitutes a proper charging decision conflict with the prosecutor's charging 
decision because they believe the nature of the decision is one that the prosecutor is equipped 
to make competently and independently.”); Standen, supra note 48, at 1510 (“In the world 
of the sentencing guidelines, the judge has little power to check prosecutorial charging 
decisions.”). 
58 Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 911, 912, 923 (2006). Bellin argues that judges can act as a check on prosecutorial 
decisions, claiming that “[a]ll prosecutors can do by themselves is let people off—a tactic 
that does not lend itself to filling prisons.” Bellin, Reassessing, supra note 56, 837, 857. 
However, this is far from the reality. Prosecutors can charge as many crimes as they want 
and basically plea bargain without any checks. There are laws that prevent prosecutorial 
accountability and while lawyers and judges should report misconduct this rarely occurs. 
Jennifer Lee, ‘Justice for All’: The Necessity of New Prosecutorial Accountability Measures 
90 MISS. L. REV. at 2 (forthcoming 2020) (“Defense attorneys remain reluctant to report 
prosecutors for unethical conduct for fear of hindering professional working relationships, 
and judges are reluctant to report prosecutors because they wish to appear “tough on crime” 
to voters. Thus, the accountability system is inherently flawed: state bar associations rely on 
judges and practitioners to report misconduct, but there is no mechanism to compel such 
complaints.”). Judges and juries often rubberstamp a prosecutor’s charging decision and plea 
bargain, with little intervention or check. 
59 Carissa Byrne Hessick, National Study of Prosecutor Elections, THE PROSECUTORS 
AND POL. PROJECT (Feb. 2020) (considering whether elections are a check on prosecutors by 
analyzing data collected from the most recent election cycles for all states that elect their 
prosecutors). 
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This wide discretion may lead to unchecked power, which creates opportunity 
for prosecutorial abuse including racial and gender bias, 60  overcharging, 61 
vindictiveness,62 plea bargaining abuses,63 and wrongful convictions.64 On the other 
side, prosecutorial discretion allows prosecutors to adapt to different scenarios 
involving unique facts and defendants and provides a way for prosecutors to manage 
their expansive caseloads through plea-bargaining,65 which some argue is necessary 
 
60 See State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 556 (Wash. 2011) (“Prosecutor Konat injected 
racial prejudice into the trial proceedings by asserting that black witnesses are unreliable.”); 
see also United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 774 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[C]ourts must not 
tolerate prosecutors’ efforts gratuitously to inject issues like race and ethnicity into criminal 
trials.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena’s D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 420 (2009) (arguing that “racially-skewed outcomes . . . 
cannot occur without prosecutorial support”); The Mo. Task Force on Gend. & Justice, 
Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 MO. L. REV. 485, 506 (1993) 
(explaining that prosecutors may assign low priority to domestic violence cases because they 
lack understanding, sensitivity, and may not believe female victims). But see Robertson et 
al., supra note 35, at 808, 844 (showing “insignificant findings of race or class bias” among 
prosecutors). 
61 Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
50, 140 (1968) (arguing the rise of plea bargaining incentivizes prosecutors to overcharge); 
See also Wright & Miller, supra note 43, at 29, 32 (arguing for a hard screening system to 
prevent prosecutorial overcharging); H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The 
Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 72 (2011) (arguing 
that game theory sheds light on prosecutors’ incentives and motivations in overcharging 
defendants). 
62 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); United States v. Goodwin, 457 
U.S. 368 (1982). 
63 See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 506 (1984) (withdrawal of plea offer after 
acceptance but before execution of plea not violative of due process); North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 40 (1970) (threat of death penalty to force a defendant to plead guilty to 
a lesser murder charge is not coercive); United States v. Kennard, 46 F. App’x. 426, 428 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (a prosecutor’s promise to treat a third party leniently during plea bargaining is 
not coercive per se); United States v. Speed Joyeros, 204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 444 (E.D.N.Y. 
2002) (extended pre-trial incarceration caused defendant’s physical and mental health to 
deteriorate, but the plea bargain was acceptable despite the danger of due process violations 
by the intensive pressure on defendant to plead guilty). 
64 See generally Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and 
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for A Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 403 
(2006) (discussing one study showing that, out of sixty-two persons exonerated by DNA 
evidence, prosecutorial misconduct played a role in twenty-six of those wrongful 
convictions); See also Baughman, Subconstitutional, supra note 47, at 1110–11; Keith A. 
Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 291 (2006) (discussing how wrongful conviction cases “challenge[] 
the traditional assumption that the criminal justice system does all it can to accurately 
determine guilt”).  
65 George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L. J. 857, 865 (2000) (arguing 
that a crushing workload and increased caseloads explain why prosecutors began to choose 
plea bargaining and why they continue to do so today). 
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for the administration of justice.66 Arguably, prosecutorial discretion puts decision 
making in the hands of those with in-depth institutional knowledge of the criminal 
justice system. Despite these benefits, many legal scholars assert prosecutorial 
discretion is too broad and gives prosecutors unchecked power.67  
Whether wide discretion is positive or not is difficult to assess due to a lack of 
transparency. 68  Legal commentators have characterized the “black box,” 69  of 
 
66 See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s 
Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORD. L. REV. 2011, 2023 (2000) (“The 
[Supreme] Court has . . . reemphasized . . . that [plea bargaining] is an essential part of the 
[criminal] process, but has failed to articulate any principled justification for the practice of 
allowing criminal defendants to lose their most fundamental rights.”); Doug Lieb, 
Vindicating Vindictiveness: Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining, Past and Future, 
123 YALE L. REV 1014, n.12 (2014) (discussing the debate about the necessity of plea 
bargaining within the criminal justice system). 
67 Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons 
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009) (“There are currently no 
effective legal checks in place to police the manner in which prosecutors exercise their 
discretion. . . . In a government whose hallmark is supposed to be the separation of powers, 
federal prosecutors are a glaring and dangerous exception.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation 
of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1049 (2006) (“A system where 
upwards of ninety-five percent of all convictions result from pleas and where prosecutors 
make all the key judgments does not fit comfortably with the separation of powers.”); 
Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 122 YALE L. J. 2150, 2150 (2013) (“The U.S. criminal system is not truly 
adversarial because prosecutors possess broad, unchecked power and therefore determine 
results in criminal cases with little or no input from the defense.”); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson 
III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1130 (2014) 
(“[U]unfettered prosecutorial discretion and the ‘relative absence of efforts to standardize 
and regulate charging practices’ lead to arbitrary charging decisions, often with an outsized 
impact on minorities and the poor.”); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 295 (2011) (“[P]rosecutorial power is unchecked by law and, given its 
invisibility, barely checked by politics."). 
68 Murray, supra note 27, at 38 (“Much of the prosecutorial accountability gap stems 
from the difficulty of evaluating performance . . . [and to an extent] stems from community 
unawareness ‘about the prosecutorial function . . . .’”); David Alan Sklansky, The Changing 
Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647, 671 (arguing the 
public lacks the ability to evaluate prosecutorial function due to the “lack of transparency”); 
see Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Are Prosecutors the Key to Justice Reform?, THE ATLANTIC, 
May 18, 2016 (discussing the difficulty of procuring prosecutor charging decisions and 
giving Manhattan as an example of the only office giving outside access to study its files). 
69 Ronald F. Wright, Kay L. Levine & Marc L. Miller, The Many Faces of Prosecution, 
EMORY LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 28, 30 (Feb. 2020). (“When one considers the 
overall body of academic work about prosecutors, this one approach—theoretical work 
grounded in anecdote, analyzed based on insights borrowed from other disciplines that 
require a certain level of abstraction—swamps the field.”) 
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prosecutorial discretion as a “dangerous” 70  and “tyrannical” 71  because it is 
“unreviewed and its justifications are unarticulated.”72 From previous work, we 
know that “many decisions and actions of a prosecutor are never recorded, or are 
recorded in documents that are difficult to obtain.”73 And prosecutors have no reason 
to open up their decisions for review.  
Despite the difficulty of obtaining data on prosecutors, the next section explores 
what we know empirically about the role of prosecutors in mass incarceration, 
particularly in the last ten to fifteen years. 
 
B.  Debates about Prosecutors’ Role in Mass Incarceration 
 
John Pfaff claims that prosecutorial discretion is the single largest cause of mass 
incarceration and is responsible for the expansive growth in felony convictions since 
the 1970s.74  Pfaff points out that violent crime increased by a hundred percent 
between 1970 and 1990 and the number of prosecutors rose by 17%.75 According to 
Pfaff, when crime rates fell from 1990 to 2007, “the number of prosecutors went up 
by 50%” and the number of prisoners also “rose with it.” 76 Unlike the volume of 
arrest that somewhat fluctuated during this period,77 “felony case filings tracks the 
 
70 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 3, 5 (1940) 
(“Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he 
thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted.”); see also Bennett L 
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 408–09 (1992) (“Uncontrolled 
discretion . . . has the potential for abuse. In the hands of prosecutors, this potential is now a 
reality.”). 
71 Henderson v. United States, 349 F.2d 712, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C.J., 
dissenting); see also Davis, supra note 54 at 393, 399 (noting that “[t]he current 
constitutional design is dysfunctional as a check on prosecutorial power”). 
72 Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical 
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1073 (1972); Carrie Leonetti, 
When the Emperor Has No Clothes III: Personnel Politics and Conflicts of Interest in 
Prosecutors’ Offices, 22 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 55 (2012) (“[U]nreviewed 
prosecutorial discretion makes a nasty cocktail when mixed with invidious forms of 
prosecutorial conduct.”). 
73 Wright, Levine & Miller, supra note 69 at 45. 
74 John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 
1239, 1240 (2012) (concluding that prosecutors are the “who” behind prison growth in the 
United States due to number of felony filings per arrest); PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12 
(“Recall that over the 1990s and 2000s crime fell, arrests, fell, and time spent in prison 
remained fairly steady. But even as the number of arrests declined the number of felony cases 
filed in state courts rose sharply. In the end, the probability that a prosecutor would file felony 
charges against and arrestee basically doubled, and that change pushed prison populations 
up even as crime dropped.”). 
75 PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12. 
76 Gopnik, supra note 7 
77 During this same time period, arrests went down from 1990-1993, went up from 
1994-1998 and then dropped again until 2005, and then increased until 2006, and then 
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number of [prison] admissions quite closely.”78 Pfaff demonstrates that in his thirty-
four state sample, between 1994 and 2008, filings grew 34% and admissions grew 
40%.79 Pfaff claims that the prosecutor’s decision to file charges “appears to be at 
the heart of prison growth.”80 Pfaff claims that particularly with violent crimes, 
prosecutors were especially tough.81 Pfaff argues that this may explain the “central 
paradox of mass incarceration: fewer crimes, more criminals; less wrongdoing to 
imprison people for, more people imprisoned.” 82  Put simply, Pfaff blames 
prosecutors over any other leading causes for mass incarceration. 
While Pfaff’s claims are provocative, two scholars provide serious challenges 
to his empirical analysis—Jeffery Bellin and Katherine Beckett.83 Jeffrey Bellin 
challenges Pfaff’s assertion that prosecutors are the reason for mass incarceration, 
stating that “few can persuasively explain how the phenomenon arose or what can 
be done to make it go away.”84 Bellin and Beckett both dispute Pfaff’s assertion that 
more felonies were filed but sentence lengths did not increase between 1980 and 
2010. 85  Indeed, other researchers have found dramatic increases in sentences 
between 1980 and 2010.86 Bellin also claims that the increase in felonies reported 
 
dropped every year from 2006-2018. See FBI, Criminal Justice Information Services, 
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (full arrest data for various years). 
78 PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12. 
79 “In my thirty-four state sample, between 1994 and 2008 filings grow by 37.4% (from 
1,392,418 to 1,913,405) while admissions grow by an almost-identical 40% (from 359,359 
to 504,715).” PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12. 
80 PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12 at 6, 74. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 See Katherine Beckett, Mass Incarceration and Its Discontents, 47 AM. SOCIOL. 
ASSOC. 1, 20 (2018) (“[I]t is difficult, perhaps impossible, to assess the reliability of Pfaff’s 
findings regarding the apparent increase in the filing-to-arrest ratio.” And “available 
evidence thus suggests that the share of felony filings that resulted in a felony conviction did 
increase and therefore that prosecutors’ filing decisions were not the only cause of the 
increase in the arrest-to-admission ratio.” 
84 Bellin, Reassessing, supra note 56 at 837 (“Americans increasingly recognize that 
“mass incarceration”—unprecedented incarceration levels well beyond those necessary to 
protect society—is a problem”). 
85 Bellin, Reassessing, supra note 56, at 844; see STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. 
STOLL, WHY ARE SO MANY AMERICANS IN PRISON? 36 (2013); Beckett, supra note 83 at 6 
(“Studies that adopt these and other methodological precautions consistently find that time 
served did increase notably in recent decades, especially in the 1990s.”). 
86  See JEREMY TRAVIS, BRUCE WESTERN, & STEVEN REDBURN, THE GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (2014) 
(The estimated increase in time served for individual categories are as follows – Murder: 
238% (1981-2000), Sexual assault: 94% (1981-2009); Drugs: 19% (1981-2000); Aggravated 
assault: 83% (1980-2000); Burglary: 41% (1980-2000); Robbery: 79% (1980-2000) and 
(finding that “the [increase in incarceration rates] can be attributed about equally to the two 
policy factors of prison commitments per arrest and increases in time served.”); RAPHAEL & 
STOLL, supra note 85, Table 2.4, p. 51 (2013) (finding that the average time served for 
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by Pfaff are questionable when State Court Processing Statistics Data (SCPS) is 
considered alongside National Center for State Courts data (NCSC).87 However, 
Pfaff defends his data claiming that the state felony filings did in fact go up during 
 
murder and negligent manslaughter increased by 55 percent, 44 percent for robbery, and 20 
percent for burglary between 1984 and 2004); Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population 
Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996, 26 CRIME JUSTICE 17, 35–36 (1999) (“There seem also 
to be upward trends [in time served] for other offenses, each rising steadily in the 1990s.” 
See URBAN INSTITUTE: JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, A MATTER OF TIME: THE CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF RISING TIME SERVED IN AMERICA’S PRISONS (2012), 
https://apps.urban.org/features/long-prison-terms/trends.html (“Since 2000, the average time 
served has risen in all 44 states (including the District of Columbia) that reported complete 
data to the National Corrections Reporting Program.”) The increase in time served for six 
offenses is as follows – Murder: 120% (1980-1996); Sexual assault: 60% (1987-1996); 
Assault: 50% (1990-1996); Robbery: 45% (1989-1996); Drugs: 76.9% (1987-1996) and 
“Given that sentence lengths for serious crimes have increased greatly since 1980, the full 
impact of lengthy sentences on the level of incarceration has yet to be felt.” The estimated 
increase in time served for individual categories are as follows – Murder: 238% (1981-2000), 
Sexual assault: 94% (1981-2009); Drugs: 19% (1981-2000); Aggravated assault: 83% (1980-
2000); Burglary: 41% (1980-2000); Robbery: 79% (1980-2000)). See also LEIGH COURTNEY 
ET AL., TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, LOW RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 3 (2017) 
(finding time served between 1990 and 2009 increased by about one-third for people 
convicted of all offense types. Violent: 37%, Property: 24%, Drug: 36%).  
87 Jeffery Bellin points out that it may be helpful to crosscheck NCSC data with SCPS 
data on felony filings (see Bellin, Reassessing, supra note 56 ((“[T]he trends in filings in the 
SCPS do not track those in the NCSC data as closely as one might wish. Between 1990 and 
2004, filings in the SCPS rise by 1.7%, and by only 8.8% between 1994 and 2004 (the data’s 
trough and peak for filings). Conversely, filings in the NCSC data rise by 34.2% between 
1994 and 2004.”)). However, the comparison would be difficult. SCPS data looks at the 
number of felony defendants in May of a certain year in 75 of the largest counties (see 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS 2009). With NCSC, 
states voluntarily send in the caseload numbers and some states report how many are felonies 
and how many are misdemeanors, (see supra note 79). NSCS felony numbers are not a 
statistically designed survey but rather self-reported numbers that NCSC brings together. In 
some years, 28 states report felony filings, other years 40 report. It would be difficult to use 
the states provided by NCSC in a year SCPS also collected data and make them represent 
similar jurisdictions to allow for comparison. In addition, Pfaff points out that comparing 
data across the years 1994 to 2008 is appropriate given the data and argues that SCPC is the 
more “quirky” dataset that is the only BJS dataset that does not allow for using its data for 
“causal analysis.” Pfaff also counters that “[r]einforcing my concerns with trusting the SCPS 
over the NCSC data is that the BJS gathers a second dataset on felony case outcomes in state 
courts, the National Judicial Reporting Program (NJRP), that produces results almost 
identical to those I find using NCSC data.” And “The core claim in my book is that both total 
felony filings as well as felony filings per arrest rise sharply, and the NJRP trends for both 
track those I derived from the NCSC data.”) See John Pfaff, Prosecutors Matter: A Response 
to Bellin’s Review of Locked In, 116 MICH. L. REV. ON. 165 (2019). 
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this period and that the data he relies on is the most representative.88 During a similar 
period, Bellin asserts that a study of federal prosecutors did not find any increase in 
felony charging.89 And according to Bellin, California reports no increase in felony 
filings during this period.90 Given this criticism, there is some dispute as to whether 
prosecutors increased felony filings over the time period alleged, and whether they 
are the largest contributor to mass incarceration.  
We do not insert ourselves in this empirical debate of whether historically 
prosecutors are a bigger cause of mass incarceration than other criminal justice 
actors like police, judges or legislators. But we are interested in current dynamics. 
Instead of just examining felony data, we examine total criminal filings—meaning 
both felony and misdemeanor filings—to see what trends we can observe with 
prosecutor charging.91 As a frame of reference, among states that report felony and 
 
88 Pfaff, Prosecutors Matter, supra note 87 (“Moreover, it should be highlighted that at 
no point in his review does Bellin show that my results are compromised by the problem he 
believes he has identified; he simply suggests it.” Given that the NCSC data is publicly 
available, Bellin could have verified that this problem existed, or asked me to share the 
NCSC data I had with him so he could have checked it himself. He makes an easily-testable 
critique without actually testing it, but then frames it as showing that my results are in 
fact driven by what he purports to have uncovered.”)  
89 Bellin, Reassessing supra note 56, at 843 (“Raphael and Stoll examined federal 
charging behavior between 1985 and 2009 and found “little evidence of systematic change 
in the rate at which U.S. attorneys prosecuted criminal suspects.”); RAPHAEL & STOLL, supra 
note 85, at 62. 
90 Bellin, Reassessing, supra note 56, at 844. 
91 NCSC numbers are the best nationally representative numbers we have on felony and 
misdemeanor filings. See STATE COURT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING, NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 1 (2020) 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0026/23984/state-court-guide-to-
statistical-reporting.pdf (“Comparable data from the state courts allows the CSP to publish 
national trends and analyze caseload statistics for use by state court leaders, policy makers, 
and local court managers.”) Criminal caseload filings are cases filed in trial court. CSP does 
not combine trial and appellate caseloads. See Correspondence with NSCS Program 
Specialist Alice Allred on May 28, 2020 (“The national totals reported here may include 
estimates for states that were unable to report caseload data in time for publication or whose 
data do not strictly conform to the reporting guidelines set forth in the State Court Guide to 
Statistical Reporting. States for whom estimates were used will not appear in any state-level 
tables in this document or any displays available on the CSP DataViewer. While the CSP 
statistical reports endeavor to provide the authoritative source for national caseload statistics, 
the official version of any state's data can only be provided by that state. The underlying data 
can be found on the CSP DataViewer at courtstatistics.org.” STATE COURT CASELOAD 
DIGEST, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 4 (2018) 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/40820/2018-Digest.pdf. Note 
that the national numbers in this section are referred to by NCSC as the “Number of Incoming 
Cases” in their reports but this paper uses the term “filings.” NCSC defines incoming cases 
as “the sum of new filings plus reopened and reactivated cases. This figure provides for a 
more complete assessment of the work of state courts.” See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE 
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misdemeanor data, around 70% of criminal cases are misdemeanor while 30% are 
felony cases.92 Today any meaningful analysis of mass incarceration must consider 
the role of misdemeanors.93 
Some elementary analysis shows that the trend for filings by prosecutors has 
reversed from what Pfaff argues. Starting in 1990, the NCSC reported that there 
were an estimated 13 million criminal case filings—both felony and misdemeanor—
and by 2002, case filings went up to 15.4 million.94 While historical comparisons 
before and after 2003 are discouraged due to methodology changes by the NCSC,95 
we can look at the period beginning in 2003. In 2003, the criminal caseload was at 
 
COURTS, 2004, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 42, 
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/607, see also 39–49 for more 
details (for instance the three state example that NCSC provides that new filings are the vast 
majority of “filings” as we refer to them). According to NCSC’s Guide to Statistical 
Reporting, filing is the original charging document (complaint, information, or indictment) 
and marks the beginning of the case. Id. at 14. Reopened cases are those “in which a judgment 
has previously been entered, but which have been restored to the court’s active pending 
caseload due to the filing of a request to modify or enforce that existing judgment . . . .” Id. 
at 17. Finally, for reactivated cases, “[c]ases that are administratively classified as inactive 
should be reported in the Caseload Summary Matrix as Placed on Inactive Status. When the 
case is reactivated, report it in the Reactivated column.” Id. See STATE COURT GUIDE TO 
STATISTICAL REPORTING, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, V. 2.2, 14–17 (February 
4, 2019), http://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0026/23984/state-court-
guide-to-statistical-reporting.pdf.  
92 This refers to reporting to NCSC. In the case of felony filings, only some states break 
down their reporting into felony and misdemeanor cases, meaning the breakdown of the 
felony or misdemeanor numbers may not be accurate as a national number from year to year. 
See Correspondence with NSCS analyst, Alice Allred on May 28, 2020. However, while 
there is not a national felony filing number, the NCSC does publish information on those 
states that do report felony numbers, such as the percent of cases that are felonies. For 
example, in 2016 between 70% - 74% of cases were misdemeanors and 24%-28% were 
felonies among 31 states, see STATEWIDE CRIMINAL CASELOAD COMPOSITION IN 31 STATES 
(2016), http://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/24052/ewsc-2016-crim-
page-3-comp-by-state.pdf. In 2018, looking at the aggregate of 32 states, 77% of cases were 
misdemeanors while 23% were felonies. STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST, NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 13 (2018). 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/40820/2018-Digest.pdf. 
93 NATAPOFF, supra note 14 and KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 4. 
94 For 1990 data see STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1990, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 25, 
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/615; For 2002 data see 
EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE COURTS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE Courts 11 (2003), 
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/606. 
95 “The introduction or reallocation of case types as defined in the Guide has had a 
subtle but discernable effect on the time-series data reported by the CSP. For this reason, 
caseload trends in this year’s Examining the Work of State Courts are not necessarily 
comparable to those published previously.” EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2004, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 9, 
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/607. 
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20.6 million and increased to 21.6 million cases at the height of mass incarceration 
in 2006.96 Since 2006, total criminal caseload filings have steadily decreased, falling 
to 17 million in 2018.97 From 2006 until 2018 prosecutors charged less felonies and 
misdemeanors each year than the year before, resulting in a decline in filings of 
21.3%.98 What this tells us is that unlike what Pfaff found in the previous period, 
after 2006, prosecutors reduced charges filed each year. 99  In other words, 
prosecutors have reduced their footprint on mass incarceration between 2006 and 
2018. As such, the larger Pfaff mass incarceration claim of prosecutors increasing 
filings—if true—ends in 2006. However, the story of prosecutors is not finished 
until we consider arrest rates. 
In addition to prosecutor charging, we also consider how police arrests impact 
mass incarceration in roughly the last ten to fifteen years. We remember that in the 
last ten to fifteen years prosecutors filed less cases each year than in previous years. 
However, when considering arrests, we realize that police arrests went down even 
more in the same period. Indeed, the decrease in prosecutor filings is not 
commensurate with the decrease in arrest, meaning that while prosecutors have 
decreased in filing, they have not decreased proportionately to what we would expect 
given the sharp decline in police arrests. In 2003, there were an estimated 13.6 
million arrests in the United States,100 and arrests increase to 14.4 million in 2006.101 
After 2006, arrests began to decrease steadily until 2018 when they drop to 10.3 
million.102 Overall, from 2006 to 2018, there was a decrease of 28.3% in the number 
 
96  For 2003 data see EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2004, NATIONAL 
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 41 (2004), 
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/607 and for 2006 data see 
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2007, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 12, 
https://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/1278. 
97 For 2018 data see STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST: 2018, NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
STATE COURTS 7, http://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/40820/2018-
Digest.pdf. 
98 For 2006 data see EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, supra note 96 at 12; for 
2018 data see STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST supra note 97 at 7, Calculation [(7,000,000 
– 21,600,000) / 21,600,000] * 100 = -21.3%  
99 There were an estimated 21.6 million criminal filings in 2006, with the estimated 
number of filings trending down each year. In 2018 there were 17 million estimated criminal 
case filings. See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, supra note 96 at 12; STATE 
COURT CASELOAD DIGEST, supra note 97 at 7. 
100  FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, 2003, 270, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2003/03sec4.pdf. This was down from 1994 arrest numbers of 14 million arrests. 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics – 1994, Bureau of Justice Statistics 374 (Tbl 4.1), 
https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scjs94.pdf. 
101 FBI, Estimated Number of Arrests (Table 29), CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2006, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2006.) 
102 FBI, Estimated Number of Arrests (Table 29), CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2018, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/tables/table-29. 
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In the last ten years or so, prosecutors have increased charging rates per arrest. 
Comparing prosecutor filings and police arrests rates in the last decade—police cut 
arrests much more than prosecutors reduced charging rates. In the most recent years 
where data is available (2006-2018), arrests went down 28.3%. 105  Prosecutors 
converted arrests into more criminal case filings (felony and misdemeanor), but their 
rate went down somewhat to 21.3%.106 This means that prosecutors are actually 
 
103 FBI, supra note 101; FBI, supra note 102. Calculation [(10,310,960 – 14,380,370) 
/ 14,380,370] * 100 = -28.3% This trend of decreasing arrest numbers had been going on for 
years, but less dramatically. From 1990-2010 there was a decrease of 8% in estimated arrest 
numbers (14.2 million in 1990 to 13.1 million in 2010), see Howard N. Snyder, Arrest in the 
United States, 1990-2010, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 16 (Table 2) (Oct. 2012), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aus9010.pdf. This of course includes the last ten years 
for which we have data as the latest state criminal filings for 2018 were published in 2020. 
104 For sources and calculations see Appendix 
105 See FBI supra note 102.  
106  See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS supra note 96. STATE COURT 
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filing more per arrest in 2018 than previously. As shown in Figure 2, in 2003 there 
were 1.51 filings per arrest,107 which rose to 1.73 in 2013,108 before plateauing in 
2018.109 We acknowledge that FBI estimates are nowhere near perfect given gaps in 
data collection.110 However, what national trends show is that police have decreased 
arrests but prosecutors have not shown a commensurate decrease in felony and 
misdemeanor case filings. In other words, prosecutors are charging more cases 
proportionately than police are, and taking the next step, are contributing more to 
mass incarceration than police.111  
 
 
for-viewing.pdf. From 2008-2017, criminal caseloads have dropped a total of 18%. 
“Criminal caseloads comprise person cases (including homicide), property cases, drug cases, 
weapons cases, DUI/DWI cases, and others. The U.S. has seen state trial court Criminal 
caseloads drop at an average annual rate of about 2 percent for the last 9 years. There was a 
slight increase reported in 2013 but caseloads continued the decline in the following year.”  
107 EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2003, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE 
COURTS 14, https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/606; See Snyder, 
supra note 103. Calculation: 20,600,000 million (Incoming Cases) / 13,646,642 (Number of 
Arrests) = 1.51 filings / arrest.  
108 EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, AN OVERVIEW OF 2013 STATE COURT 
CASELOADS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, pg. 7; FBI, Estimated Number of 
Arrests (Table 29), CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2013, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-
29/table_29_estimated_number_of_arrests_united_states_2013.xls Calculation: 19,500,000 
million (Incoming Cases) / 11,302,102 (Number of Arrests) = 1.73 filings / arrest.  
109 FBI, supra, note 102; State Court Caseload Digest, supra note 92 at 7 Calculation: 
17,000,000 million (Incoming Cases) / 10,310,960 (Number of Arrests) = 1.65 filings / arrest. 
110 Snyder, supra note 103 (showing reported arrests and estimated arrests differing by 
2-4 million per year between 1990 and 2010, due to the percentage of agencies reporting 
ranging from 75-83%). While arrest numbers are not perfect, given the best national 
estimated number of arrests, the percent change in arrests has gone down between 2006 and 
2018 by 28%. 
111 See supra note 91 for discussion of NCSC data usage.  
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These trends, though taken with some degree of caution due to persistent errors 
in reporting, demonstrate an important finding. Although prosecutors have 
dramatically reduced case filings, given arrest numbers, their reductions should be 
much more dramatic. The question left unanswered with the data is despite what we 
know about mass incarceration, why are prosecutors continuing to charge in greater 
amounts, when crime and arrests have gone down? That is to say, why have they not 
further reduced their contribution to mass incarceration? Our empirical study in Part 
II provides some insight on national prosecutor charging, but first we must 
understand empirical work on prosecutor charging. 
The next section discusses the prior empirical studies on prosecutors and their 
limitations. 
 
C.  Limitations of Prior Research of Prosecutorial Decisions 
 
Existing research on prosecutors has significant limitations and fails to answer 
basic questions about prosecutor charging. How many crimes does a prosecutor 
charge based on a single incident? How often do prosecutors decline to charge a case 
when they have evidence to charge? When does a prosecutor charge a felony when 
a misdemeanor will do? These basic questions are left unanswered.  
Many existing studies are outdated or lack empirical rigor.112 For example, 
some prior work is based on important—though anecdotal—experience of a single 
 
112 Ronald F. Wright, Kay L. Levine & Marc L. Miller, The Many Faces of Prosecution, 
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prosecutor.113 And while several experiments have studied prosecutorial decisions, 
including plea bargaining,114 most of these have relied on lay persons as the subjects, 
rather than actual prosecutors. 115  Some have treated prosecutors as economic 
actors—using game theory or other economic theories to model hypothetical 
 
113 See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2010) 
(describing the challenges with race and police corruption in his experience as a prosecutor 
in Washington D.C.); ALEXANDER, supra note 5 (describing the problems of mass 
incarceration and the “new racial caste system” based on her experience as a civil rights 
lawyer). 
114 Shawn D. Bushway, Allison D. Redlich & Robert J. Norris, An Explicit Test of Plea 
Bargaining in The “Shadow of the Trial”, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723 (2014) (demonstrating in 
an experiment with 378 prosecutors that prosecutors offer and defendants accept plea 
bargains “in the shadow” of the likely trial outcomes for the given case; such that severity of 
the agreed punishment tracks the ease of proving guilt and the heinousness of the 
crime)Wright, Levine & Miller, supra note 112, at 35 (referencing Milton Heumann’s studies 
interviewing prosecutors concluding that “prosecutors started out their criminal justice 
careers in a highly adversarial, trial-oriented mode, but slowly drifted into plea bargaining”); 
Wright & Miller, supra note 43, at 74 (testing the “screening/[plea] bargaining tradeoff” 
within the New Orleans District Attorney’s Office noting higher rates of open pleas and 
lower rates of charge bargains and dismissals than other jurisdictions); Leonard R. Mellon, 
Joan E. Jacoby & Marion A. Brewer, The Prosecutor Constrained by His Environment: A 
New Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 52, 79-81 
(1981); See also infra note 126. 
115  Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An 
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMIN. 1 (2013) (studying college students to demonstrate that they would falsely admit 
guilt for something in return); Christopher Engel & Alicja Katarzyna Pluta, The People’s 
Hired Guns? Experimentally Testing the Inclination of Prosecutors to Abuse the Vague 
Definition of Crimes https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1885425 (using 
students as hypothetical prosecutors and studying in a game theory experiment whether 
prosecutors risk taking a case to court and following their duty); DAN SIMON ET AL., 
PARTISANSHIP AND PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING: AN EXPERIMENT (2009) 
(determining with a study of lay people that anger likely plays a role in prosecutorial 
decisions in a case); Barbara O’Brien, Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay 
between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutor Decision Making, 
74 MO. L. REV. 999 (2009) (studying lay participants and hypothesizing based on 
psychological research that “when people are judged primarily for their ability to persuade 
others of their position, they are susceptible to defensive bolstering at the expense of 
objectivity” and arguing that prosecutors are “particularly susceptible to biases that 
undermine their ability to honor obligations that require some objectivity on their part”). 
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prosecutorial decisions.116  Others have looked at the organization of prosecutor 
offices to determine whether group dynamics impact decisions.117  
Prior research has examined how to predict factors prosecutors consider when 
deciding to file criminal charges in particular cases,118 and their decision to dismiss 
or decline to pursue a case after charges have been filed.119 Much of this prior work 
 
116 Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the 
Decision to Go to Trial, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 149 (2001) (using game theory to model 
prosecutorial plea bargaining and other decisions); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2007) (modeling plea bargaining and arguing that quick pleas are 
preferred and do not harm innocent defendants); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining 
and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1988) (relying on game theory to 
understand plea bargaining and model prosecutorial discretion); Oren Gazal-Ayal & Limor 
Riza, Economic Analysis of Plea-Bargaining and Prosecution, in CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 145 (Nuno Garoupa, ed. 2009) (conducting a law and economics approach to 
prosecutorial decisions, including plea bargaining). 
117 Mellon, Jacoby & Brewer, supra note 114 at 52, 79–81 (discussing how office set 
up and community differences affect prosecutor charging and other decision patterns in a 
large study of prosecutor offices in urban areas). Wright, Levine, & Miller, supra note 112, 
at 40–41 (finding that prosecutors’ offices with pyramidal organizational structures had “the 
greatest sense of team membership as well as a strong staff loyalty to, and respect for, the 
administration” whereas offices with flat organizational structures “expressed low levels of 
regard for the administration and tended to conceive of themselves and their coworkers in 
independent terms”). 
118 See Celesta A. Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty: 
Toward a Theory of Discretionary Decision Making in Felony Case Processing, 24 CRIMIN. 
623–44 (1986) (“case information that decreases uncertainty concerning victim/witness 
management will increase the probability of continued prosecution. . . In addition, the data 
indicate that prosecuting attorneys are less likely to continue prosecution of cases involving 
female defendants and are more likely to continue prosecution of defendants whose bail 
outcome includes financial conditions for release”); Eric P. Baumer, Steven F. Messner & 
Richard B. Felson, The Role of Victim Characteristics in the Disposition of Murder Cases, 
17 JUSTICE Q. 281–307 (2000) (finding that “victim characteristics affect the processing of 
murder cases” and that “disreputable or stigmatized victims tend to be treated more leniently 
by the criminal justice system”); Dawn Beichner & Cassia Spohn, Prosecutorial Charging 
Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases: Examining the Impact of a Specialized Prosecution Unit, 
16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 461–98 (2005) (examining various victim factors as predictors 
of a prosecutor’s decision to file charges comparing a Kansas City sex crimes unit to a 
nonspecialized Miami unit finding “very few differences” between the two with 49% 
resulting in prosecution in Kansas city and 47% in Miami); Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, 
Prosecuting Sexual Assault: A Comparison of Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases 
Involving Strangers, Acquaintances, and Intimate Partners, 18 JUSTICE Q. 651–88 (2001) 
(“[V]ictim characteristics influenced the decision to charge or not in cases in which the 
victim and the suspect were acquaintances, relatives, or intimate partners.”).  
119  VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND 
DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY’S COURTS (1977); Richard Frase, The Decision to File 
Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 246, 251 (1980) (“[L]ess than one-fourth of the complaints received by the ninety-four 
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deals with sexual assault and murder cases where findings are limited to those 
cases.120 
Prior studies conflict on how often prosecutors decline to charge case. Based 
on local data from 1978, Leonard Mellon, Joan Jacoby, and Marion Brewer 
demonstrate that the declination rate of prosecutors in three cities ranges from 43% 
in New Orleans to 4% in Brooklyn.121 A national study from the 1980s, asserts 
prosecutors dismiss around 50% of felony cases.122 Yet a 1998 national study of 
state prosecutors and some of the latest nationwide surveys found that they 
dismissed cases 25% of the time.123 A recent declination study by Miller et al, 
 
U.S. Attorneys appear to result in the filing of formal charges.”); Michael Edmund O’Neill, 
Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predicative 
Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV 1439, 1445, 1497 (2004) (finding that “as federal criminal 
justice resources have expanded, declinations have fallen” from 36% in 1994 to 26% in 2000) 
Kenneth Adams & Charles R. Cutshall, Refusing to Prosecute Minor Offenses: The Relative 
Influence of Legal and Extralegal Factors, 4 JUSTICE Q. 595-609, 600–01 (1987)(indicating 
that variables such as number of charges, priors arrests, number or witnesses, value of stolen 
merchandise, gender, race, residence, and age “have a statistically significant relationship” 
with the decision to prosecute.); Carole W. Barnes & Rodney Kingsnorth, 24 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 39–55, 46 tbl 5 (1996) (indicating that the percentage of cases rejected at the outset is 
16.4% for African Americans, 14.2% for Latinos, and 10.4% for Caucasians)”; Carl E. Pope, 
The Influence of Social and Legal Factors on Sentencing Dispositions: A Preliminary 
Analysis of Offender-Based Transaction Statistics, 4 J. CRIM. JUST. 203-21 (1976) (The age, 
race, sex, and previous criminal histories of felony defendants are considered with regard to 
sentence outcomes and the length of both jail and probation commitments.”).  
120 See Albonetti, supra note 118, at 623–44. 
121 Mellon, Jacoby & Brewer, supra note 114, at 79 Table A (Also in Salt Lake City in 
1978, prosecutors declined to charge in 11.9% of cases). Mellon et al. blame the differences 
in charging on different make ups of offices. 
122 Bellin, Reassessing, supra note 56 at 846 citing Barbara Boland et al., Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Dep’t of Justice, THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS, 1979, at 2 (1983) 
(looking at felony arrests between 1979 and 1988 and finding that prosecutors “carried 
forward” 50% of all felony arrests recommended for prosecution). He also relies on a federal 
study, which is less applicable. Frase, supra note 119, at 246, 278 (filing in less than 1/5 of 
cases). 
123  See Travis Franklin, Community Influence on Prosecutorial Dismissals: A 
Multilevel Analysis of Case- and County-Level Factors, 38 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 693–701 (2010) 
(using 1998 national SCPS data for over 15,000 state felony defendants in 75 counties to 
find that on “average prosecutors dismissed approximately 25 percent of cases” and that 
dismissals increased in some situations with minority or poor defendants, and that politically 
conservative communities tended to be less likely to dismiss cases). A study of federal 
prosecutors found that declinations went down from 36% in 1994 to 26% in 2000. Michael 
E. O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations,79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221 (2003). See Felonies in Large Urban Counties, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2009, at 39 t31 (2010) (“These reports reveal a postfiling felony 
dismissal rate of 29 percent in 1990, 27 percent in 1998, and 25 percent in 2009.”); see also 
Brian A. Reaves, Felonies in Large Urban Counties, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1998, 
at 24 tlb 21, tbl 23 (2001) and Pheny Z. Smith, Felonies in Large Urban Counties, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1990 at 13 tbl 15 (1993) (56,616 filings). 
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demonstrates high declination rates at about 51% in New Orleans over a period of 
ten years.124 However, a careful look at the Miller study shows that when prosecutors 
decline to charge, it is because they are charging some other crime, they lack 
evidence or victim cooperation or for some other legitimate reason.125 It is not clear 
in the study when the prosecutor declined the charges, but given the reasons for 
declining being largely witness or evidence based, it seems like maybe the 
prosecutors charged initially and then dropped charges as they got further into the 
evidence.126  
Importantly, most of the prior work is based on federal charging decisions that 
differ meaningfully from state charging decisions, which constitute the vast majority 
of the criminal caseload.127 Despite the relative importance of state prosecutors, 
many studies rely on federal criminal cases and study federal prosecutors.128 While 
there are 93 U.S. attorneys, there are about 2,400 chief state-level prosecutors, most 
 
124 Miller & Wright, supra note 30, at 74 (“[Prosecutors declined . . . 52% of all 
charges”) 
125 Miller & Wright, supra note 30, Table 1. 
126 Id. at Table 1. 
127 Kathleen F. Brickey, Charging Practices in Hazardous Waste Crime Prosecutions, 
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077 (2001) (“[federal] RCRA prosecutions are based not on a single 
isolated act, like disposing of a solvent-laden rag, but on a course of conduct that more often 
than not involves multiple violations of several criminal statutes.”); Frase, supra note 119, 
at 246, 274 (noting that “state offenses for which [] defendants were to be charged were not 
always direct counterparts of the federal charges”); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 539 (1992) (“[Certain] sentences are 
much higher for offenders convicted in state court than under the federal guidelines. 
However, agents prefer to bring cases in federal court to avoid the discovery required under 
state rules of criminal procedure. Defendants are willing to plead to the guideline sentence 
in order to receive a shorter sentence than they would in state court and avoid the state prison 
system”); Rabin, supra note 72, at 1058 (describing the guidance contained within the U.S. 
Attorney’s Manual with regard to “state criminal penalties ‘overlapping’ federal penalties”); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Ten Years Later: Plea Negotiations under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-
Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1287 (1997) (examining how the United States 
Sentencing Commission’s 1987 sentencing guidelines impacted state systems); Michael A. 
Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecutorial Guidelines: A Case Study in 
Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 895 (2000) (demonstrating that “crimes 
that have been traditionally been prosecuted is state court” have been federalized while 
articulating the concerns and objections of such federalization).  
128 O’Neill, Understanding, supra note 119, at 1439; Kyle Graham, Crimes, Widgets, 
and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content, Pleas, and Trials, 100 CAL. L. REV. 
1573 (2012); Cheryl X. Long & Richard T. Boylan, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career 
Objectives of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2005); Ronald F. Wright, Trial 
Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 
(2005); Frase, supra note 119, at 246; O’Neill, Understanding, supra note 119, at 1439; 
Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in Federal Courts, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 293 (1975); Starr & Rehavi, supra note 26. 
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of whom are elected locally.129 The federal criminal docket is largely made up of 
drug crimes, firearms and immigration cases.130 State prosecutors handle the violent 
felonies like murder, rape, and robbery. These are the crimes that make Americans 
feel unsafe in their communities—and constitute the biggest contributors to the U.S. 
prison population.131 Also, given the larger volume of misdemeanors they handle, 
state prosecutors could hypothetically decline to prosecute more cases than federal 
prosecutors. In order to adequately understand incarceration in the U.S., it is critical 
to study state prosecutors.132  
While state charging practices have been studied empirically, these studies 
rarely can explain why prosecutors make the decisions that they do.133 Instead, the 
 
129 Lantigua-Williams, supra note 68 (almost 2400 prosecutors); THE PROSECUTORS 
AND POLITICS PROJECT, NATIONAL STUDY OF PROSECUTOR ELECTIONS 10 (2020). In 
contrast, there are only around 90 federal U.S. Attorneys (or head federal prosecutors) 
nationally. Perry & Banks, supra note 21. 
130  Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. COURTS, (2018) available at 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018 
(reporting that for 2018 the U.S. district court filings for immigration crimes and firearms 
accounted for 29 and 13 percent respectively of all criminal defendant filings). 
131  Pfaff, Micro and Macro, supra note 74, at 1239, 1245–46 (arguing that after 
analyzing violent crime, “increase in crime thus does not inexorably lead to an increase in 
prisoners”); But see Beckett, supra note 83, at 18 (“[B]y 1998, more than two-thirds of 
people admitted to U.S. state prisons for a violent offense had been sentenced under a TIS 
law that required that they serve at least 85 percent of their sentence and there is evidence 
that these statutes increased both time served and prison populations.”)  
132  Wright, Levine, & Miller, supra note 112, at 31 (Wright, Levine and Miller 
articulate the importance of studying state cases—these prosecutors handle “larger volumes 
of cases” including misdemeanors, have a more “varied docket,” and indeed, “understanding 
of the true impact and variety of criminal prosecution in the United States, therefore, must 
give the state prosecutor a starring role rather than a bit part.”). 
133  Adam Gershowitz & Laura Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive 
Prosecutor Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 N.W. U. L. REV. 261, 265 (2011) 
(relying on “caseloads of prosecutors in some of the largest district attorneys' offices in the 
nation”); Michael Kades, Exercising Discretion: A Case Study of Prosecutorial Discretion 
in the Wisconsin Department of Justice, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 115, 121 (1997) (examining three 
units within the Wisconsin Department of Justice responsible for prosecuting white-collar 
crime); Gary D. LaFree, The Effect of Sexual Stratification by Race on Official Reactions to 
Rape, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 842, 844 (1980) (This study includes a sample of 881 suspects 
charged with forcible sex offenses in a large Midwestern city, between 1970 and 1975.); 
Cassia Spohn, D. Beichner & E. Davis-Frenzel, Prosecutorial Justifications for Sexual 
Assault Case Rejection: Guarding the “Gateway to Justice,” 48 SOC. PROBS. 206, 208 
(2001) (“Our study focuses explicitly on prosecutors’ charging decisions in sexual assault 
cases”); Elizabeth Anne Stanko, The Impact of Victim Assessment on Prosecutors’ Screening 
Decisions: The Case of the New York County District Attorney’s Office, 16 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 225, 226 (1981) (“The setting of this study is a bureau within the New York County 
(Manhattan) prosecutor’s office that is devoted solely to the screening of felon”); Wright & 
Miller, supra note 43 at 29, 36 (relying on charging and bargaining decisions within New 
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studies are focused on particular jurisdictions or types of crime and lack many details 
because their source of data is based on court records, written files and budget data. 
None of these get to the qualitative questions of what the prosecutor is thinking, or 
why they do what they do.134  
 
Orleans from 1988 to 1998). See also JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A 
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 3 (1980) (Prosecutors’ offices typically rely on “local representation 
applying local standards to the enforcement of essentially local laws.”). 
134 Wright, Levine, & Miller, supra note 112, at 34 (Wright, Levine and Miller state 
this problem best: “Nevertheless, archival research must live with critical blind spots. 
Countless important moments in the criminal process are never recorded. The players record 
many other moments for themselves, but only in paper files that remain unconnected to one 
another and out of reach for all but the most persuasive and persistent researchers.) see also 
Nicholas Petersen & Mona Lynch, Prosecutorial Discretion, Hidden Costs, and the Death 
Penalty: The Case of Los Angeles County, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 1233 (2012). 
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Still, there are many foundational qualitative studies of prosecutorial 
discretion.135 Except for a few,136 they are somewhat outdated or localized.137 And 
 
135 Alschuler, supra note 61, at 50, 52 (interviewing prosecutors, defense attorneys, trial 
judges, and other officials in ten urban jurisdictions and arguing that plea bargaining should 
be abolished.); FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT 
WITH A CRIME (1969) (Field study of cities and rural areas in Wisconsin, Kansas, and 
Michigan from 1955 through 1957, finding that the role of the executive and the judiciary in 
charging need to be observed and re-evaluated); Donald Newman, Pleading Guilty for 
Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L. CRIMIN. & POLICE SCI. 780, 
781,788 (1956) (Study interviewed a sample of 97 who had been convicted in one Wisconsin 
court district, finding that the majority of the felony convictions in the district were 
compromise convictions, the result of bargaining between defense and prosecution in an 
informal process.); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCE OF 
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 11–14 (1978) (Seventy-one interviews 
with judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in six courts in Connecticut about plea 
bargaining post Supreme Court’s Santobello decision, finding a willingness among court 
participants to discuss plea bargaining, unlike earlier studies.); PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING 
THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL COURT, xi-xiv (1978) (conducting 
15 months of field work in two California jurisdictions – San Diego and Alameda Counties, 
and finding that “while the inner dynamics of negotiation push each side to objectively 
consider the other side, there are often pressures – such as public apprehensiveness about 
crime, severe penal code, and illegitimacy of prosecutorial policy making – that bind 
participants to rigid institutional roles”); Mellon, Jacoby & Brewer, supra note 114 at 52-53) 
(Examining state prosecutorial styles, through quantitative and qualitative data, in America’s 
urban areas by looking at ten geographically dispersed prosecutors’ offices and finding that 
American prosecutors cannot be discussed in universal terms, and differences in prosecution 
policy are often mandated by environmental factors that individual prosecutors have no 
control over); PETER F. NARDULLI ET AL., THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND 
THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS (1988) (studying decisions of the head prosecutor in nine 
different offices in a multi-year study and analyzing the nature and disparity in the guilty 
plea system by looking at nine jurisdictions, finding that plea negotiations are influenced by 
various elements including charging practices, prosecutorial screening, centralization of plea 
offers, judge shopping, and the frequency of sentence (as opposed to charge) bargaining); 
Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and 
Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 531, 534 
(1997) (observing case processing and interviewed prosecutors and detectives in the sexual 
assault unit of a prosecutor’s office in a major metropolitan area on the West Coast, finding 
that organizational concern about the ability to convict in “discordant locales” was a frequent 
unofficial justification for case rejection). 
136 One recent study relies on extensive prosecutor interviews to determine how they 
view themselves and their roles. See Wright, Levine, & Miller, supra note 112, at 38 
(interviewing 267 prosecutors via interviews in two regions—American Southeast and 
Southwest between the years of 2010-2013; these prosecutors handle misdemeanors or 
felonies and some handle both cases, argues that using a mixed-methodology approach will 
allow researchers to understand prosecution culture better and better map prosecution 
behavior); see also an earlier paper based on these same interviews Kay Levine & Ronald 
Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 1119, 1122–23 (2012) (focusing on 
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even if they were current, they fail to answer the basic questions we want to know 
about prosecutor charging.138 
Several surveys have tried to gain some insight into prosecutor decisions.139 
But surveys may not allow for causal inference. The gold standard is a field study 
 
a subset of forty-two interviews—those of the misdemeanor prosecutors and the drug 
prosecutors—from two metropolitan areas in the Southeast during 2010 and suggesting that 
“a prosecutor’s professional identity might affect, or be reflected in, the outcomes she 
achieves in criminal cases and the consistency of those outcomes.” Other recent studies rely 
on surveys as well as interviews and some interviews and either observation or court data to 
fill in the gaps. Deidre Bowen, Calling Your Bluff: How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys 
Adapt Plea Bargaining Strategies to Increased Formalization, 26 JUST. Q. 2, 6–7 & 25–6 
(2009) (Observed forty-two plea negotiations and conducted formal and informal interviews 
with attorneys in Seattle in 2000 and found that in this reformed plea bargaining system, 
neutrality did not materialize, prosecutors had more power than under the traditional plea 
bargain model, and while there was greater efficiency, it is not clear that justice was 
achieved); Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and 
Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L. J. 691, 706–09, 745–46 (2006) 
(interviews with California deputy district attorneys from 1999-2002, finding that 
prosecutors operate in organizational settings, responds to collective understandings about 
which cases are prosecution worthy and why, and construct typologies of offenders to 
manage large caseloads of similar events); Levine, supra note 17, at 1125, 1127, & 1211–14 
(mailing surveys to all statutory rape prosecutors in California and following up with 
interviews with 30 district attorneys' offices, finding that while “the ‘new prosecution’ 
model—where prosecutors take on roles such as counselor, legislature, and investigator—
building on decades of increased prosecutorial power and moves to make the system more 
responsible to community concerns, may be more of a problem, than a solution”); Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson, 
25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 916–17, 941–42 (2012) (qualitative research conducted 
through interviews from 2011-2012 with New Orleans First District prosecutors and other 
criminal justice actors on disclosure obligations with increase in caseloads). 
137 Wright, Levine, & Miller, supra note 112, at 34 (discussing outdated studies); See 
supra 136 for localized studies. 
138 See intro text accompanying notes 32 to 33 for basic questions. 
139  See BRUCE FREDERICK & DON STEMEN, THE ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN 
ANALYSIS OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING (2012) at iii, 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/anatomy-of-
discretionsummary-report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NAW6-ESKB (relying on 
surveys, focus group discussions, and some analysis of court data from two jurisdictions and 
finding that “prosecutors’ decisions were guided by two basic questions: ‘Can I prove the 
case?’ and ‘Should I prove the case?’”); Don Stemen & Bruce Frederick, Rules, Resources, 
and Relationships: Contextual Constraints on Prosecutorial Decision Making, 31 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 83 (2013) (finding that prosecutor decisions were shaped by internal 
rules, external resource constraints and interdependent relationships); Kim Banks Mayer, 
Comment, Applying Open Records Policy to Wisconsin District Attorneys: Can Charging 
Guidelines Promote Public Awareness? 1996 WIS. L. REV. 295 (relying on a survey of 
Wisconsin prosecutors finding that they prosecutorial guidelines should not be open to the 
public). 
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or randomized controlled trial.140 But thus far there have not been any randomized 
controlled trials of prosecutor decisionmaking, and few experiments at all.141 As 
Wright, Levine and Miller have astutely pointed out, prosecutors will be tempted to 
offer a more flattering picture of their decisionmaking that may not match up with 
their decisions in a real case.142 Indeed, some qualitative research has failed to offer 
a “reliable portrait of the actual job performance of the prosecutor.”143 As Wright et 
al. point out: “The best research settings are those that allow researchers to confirm 
a prosecutor’s claims about performance with a statistical record of that 
performance.” 144  This is important because individual prosecutors differ in 
demographics, career goals, work quality, and in experience.145 It is also important, 
as others have recognized, to study a variety of regional offices, different sizes of 
offices, and possibly question defense attorneys as well “for an alternative take on 
the work of prosecutors in the jurisdiction.”146 Our study below attempts to avoid 
some previous limitations with a mixed methods study, and is the first national study 
attempted of its kind. 
 
II.  NATIONAL PROSECUTOR STUDY 
 
We designed a mixed methods study of prosecutor decisionmaking that 
contained a web-administered questionnaire embedded with experimental vignettes, 
close-ended questions, and open-ended questions. The vignettes contained police 
reports describing an incident that ends in an arrest, and the reports varied the race 
and class of the defendant. After reviewing the reports, the prosecutor participating 
in our study was then asked to decide whether to charge the individual with a crime 
(a felony or misdemeanor or both), whether to pursue a fine or imprisonment, and 
the amounts thereof.147 As part of the study, the prosecutors also were provided the 
 
140 Shima Baradaran et al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2014). 
141  See this study that uses randomization in assigning cases: CARLY W. SLOAN, 
RACIAL BIAS BY PROSECUTORS: EVIDENCE FROM RANDOM ASSIGNMENT (June 14, 2019), 
and this international study from Colombia: Strengthening Prosecutors’ Capacities for 
Sexual Crime Investigations: Evidence from Colombia, AMERICAN ECONOMICS 
ASSOCIATION REGISTRY FOR RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIALS (Sept. 27, 2018). 
142 Wright, Levine, & Miller, supra note 112, at 44. (“Qualitative research centered on 
semi-structured interviews of prosecutors has one significant drawback that is particularly 
relevant to this research: it does not offer a reliable portrait of the actual job performance of 
the prosecutor. The interviewee might talk about how she selects charges or decides whether 
to take a case to trial, but that self-portrayal might not prove accurate if the full statistical 
record were available.”) (“We recognize that many people are inclined to paint themselves 
in the best light when talking to interviewers.”) 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 45. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 See Robertson et al., supra note 35. The vignettes contained different race and social 
class descriptions of this individual to determine whether race and social class affect 
prosecutor decision making. We found no such effect.  
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opportunity to write comments justifying all their charging and punishment 
decisions, and also to describe how charging decisions are usually made in their 
local offices.  
This section summarizes the descriptive quantitative and qualitative results of 
our mixed methods study. Some results from the experiment have been published,148 
but the normative implications of our survey results and the qualitative analyses have 
until now, not been published. 
 
A.  Sample 
 
We sought to study real prosecutors. However, no comprehensive database of 
U.S. prosecutors is available for research purposes, and initial discussions with 
prosecutor organizations were unfruitful for research collaboration. We reached out 
to the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) and the American Bar 
Association Prosecutors Section about our study of prosecutors. The NDAA seemed 
open to cooperation until we showed them our study; they were concerned that our 
study could reveal that prosecutors are biased on the basis of race.149 Without access 
to any national prosecutor lists, we constructed a sample of state prosecutors by 
selecting one to two states from each of the nine United States Census regional 
divisions. Non-federal prosecutor names and email addresses were collected from 
prosecutor office websites and state bar associations. To identify more prosecutors, 
we sent FOIA requests to states to obtain additional prosecutor names and contact 
information. Information was obtained for at least one respondent from most states.  
After collecting contact information for 4,484 prosecutors, we emailed them an 
invitation to participate in the study.150 Respondents were told that, “the purpose of 
this research study is to understand how prosecutors make decisions.”151 In total, 
541 prosecutors completed the study for a 12.09% response rate.152  
 
148  The first paper discussing this 2017 experiment discusses the lack of racial or 
socioeconomic bias observed by prosecutors in their charging decisions. See Robertson et 
al., supra note 35. Others will be forthcoming discussing other aspects of prosecutorial 
decision-making. Some of the descriptions in Part II A-D of the experiment are taken from 
the Robertson et al. piece. 
149 We did not find racial or socioeconomic bias, however. Robertson et al., supra note 
35. 
150 Respondents received a link to the study hosted on Qualtrics and an offer of a $5 
Amazon gift card in 2017 and 2018. See DON DILLMAN, MAIL AND INTERNET SURVEYS: THE 
TAILORED DESIGN METHOD (2000) (offering nominal compensation improves response 
rates). 
151 The protocol was approved by the University of Utah Institutional Review Board.  
152 In our prior work, we report experimental results from 468 prosecutors based on the 
experimental portion of this study. So, for example, in the prior study, if a prosecutor did not 
answer the question on their recommended punishment, they were excluded from analysis 
because that question was the outcome of interest. We report on the full sample in this study 
given that we are mostly focused on their qualitative responses, and so if a prosecutor didn’t 
answer all questions, they may still have written valuable information on their decision-
making process. See Robertson et al., supra note 35. 
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Although we did not conduct a random sample of prosecutors, the profile of the 
respondents is representative of state prosecutors in several ways. 153  Nearly a 
quarter, 23%, of respondents were lead prosecutors, and 79% worked in the felony 
division. The length of time respondents served as prosecutors ranged from less than 
a year to 45 years with a median length of service of 10 years. Approximately 65% 
of the sample were men. Respondents ranged in age from 26 to 77, with a median 
age of 45. Ninety-six percent of respondents were non-Hispanic, 90% were white, 
4% were black, 4% were “other,” and the remainder were Native American or Asian. 
Few respondents came from highly populous jurisdictions. Only 8% of respondents 
were in a jurisdiction of over 2 million, 11% in a jurisdiction of between 1-2 million, 
10% in a jurisdiction of 500,000-1 million, 28% in a jurisdiction of 100,000-
500,000, and 43% in a jurisdiction of less than 100,000. Due to differences in data 
availability and response rates, the sample primarily consists of prosecutors from the 
Mountain (23%), East North Central (21%), South Atlantic (16%), Pacific (12%), 
West North Central (11%), and East South Central (9%) regions. Relatively few 
respondents were from New England, Mid-Atlantic, and West South Central states. 
Additional information on the sample can be accessed in our other publications.154  
 
B.  Mixed Methods Study Design 
 
Study respondents first viewed police reports. The police reports in the study 
are purposely designed to allow a prosecutor to charge major, minor, or no crimes 
at all. In the vignette, a slightly intoxicated man is found in a subway station yelling 
obscenities, asking people for money, and brandishing a knife. He is frustrated that 
no one will give him money and reports having just broken up with his girlfriend to 
police. At one point, he is angered that a certain woman does not give him money 
after repeated requests and grabs her arm. He does not threaten her specifically but 
does “dangle a knife at his side by his other arm.” The police then arrive and arrest 
him. He has no prior criminal record. 
The reports describe circumstances that can be viewed as assault, or potential 
aggravated assault, depending on how the prosecutor understands the situation and 
individual. The vignette is designed to allow for maximum discretion of the 
prosecutor, for optimal study of discretion. We also chose assault as the crime 
because we are especially interested in how state prosecutors charge in violent crime 
cases. 155  Given the data-backed argument that violent crimes fuel mass 
incarceration,156 we thought a violent crime—though one that was marginal—would 
be helpful in determining how prosecutors use their discretion. Nonetheless, we 
hypothesized that maximal prosecutor discretion might be in a situation where no 
 
153 Robertson et al., supra note 35. 
154 Id. at Table 1. See also Megan Wright et al., Inside the Black Box of Prosecutor 
Decisions (working paper). 
155 See supra Pfaff discussion of violent crime note 175 and accompanying text. 
156 See supra note 38–40 (“[V]iolent crime increased by a hundred percent between 
1970 and 1990 . . . and number of prisoners ‘rose with it’”). 
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victim is physically harmed.157 We anticipated that some prosecutors would charge 
defendant, and many would refuse to charge given the lack of injury. Prosecutors 
were also provided with an abbreviated two-page (623 word) statutory code and 
sentencing guidelines based on the laws of a real state, defining these crimes and 
specifying the punishment ranges for each. 158  The study was designed to take 
participants about 15 minutes to complete.159 
Respondents were first asked which charges they would apply, with choices 
ranging from no charges to aggravated assault. Respondents then indicated if they 
would press multiple charges. Next, respondents were asked to “indicate which 
confinement term and/or monetary penalty, if any, you would most likely seek in a 
plea deal with the suspect (i.e., the term and/or penalty that would ultimately satisfy 
your pursuit of justice). In answering this question, you may refer to the sentencing 
guidelines if you wish.” Respondents had separate blanks for confinement and 
monetary penalty and were also able to note suspension of these penalties. Most 
respondents also provided additional comments justifying their charging decisions 
that we studied and coded separately. The vignettes manipulated the race and social 
class of the defendant in order to assess whether these status characteristics affect 
prosecutors’ decisions. We found no such effect, and the findings from the 
experimental part of the study have been previously published.160 
We also collected information regarding how prosecutors make charging 
decisions, information respondents need to make a charging decision, information 
about respondents’ career as a prosecutor, and demographic information, using both 
close-ended and open-ended questions, and responses to the latter lend themselves 
to the qualitative analysis. We coded the written responses both deductively (based 
on the type of questions we asked) and inductively (based on themes that emerged 
from the data). We do not discuss strengths and limitation of our study design in this 
paper, as some of this has been covered by prior work and will be covered by future 
work.161 
 
C.  Study Findings 
 
 
157 We certainly appreciate that the fact scenario we devised may cause emotional harm 
or trauma to the victim. 
158 We relied on the Utah criminal code. 
159 The case-vignettes were manipulated between-subjects in five conditions, a 2x2 
factorial + control design to test effects of defendants’ race, white versus black, and 
defendants’ social class, higher-status accountant versus working-class fast food worker. In 
the control condition, race and class are redacted altogether in order to assess differences 
from the baseline. Moreover, a control allows us to pilot-test a potential blinding reform to 
be used in the field, in which real prosecutors would make charging decisions without 
knowledge of these extraneous factors of race and class. The results of this aspect of the 
randomized controlled experiment are discussed in Robertson et al, supra note 35. 
160 Robertson et al., supra note 35. 
161 An in-depth discussion of study strengths and weaknesses can be found in our 
forthcoming piece, Wright et al., Inside, supra note 155. 
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Our study can provide insight into the prosecutor’s role in mass incarceration. 
For example, how many crimes do prosecutors charge based on a single incident of 
the type recorded in the study vignettes? How much jail time do prosecutors impose 
on average for this type of incident, and what is the range of fine amounts? How 
often do prosecutors choose to decline charging? Is there national variation in the 
severity of charging? 
Our study revealed several important findings, which we preview here and 
describe in detail below. First, while the vast majority of respondents did not opt to 
charge the most severe charge or impose incarceration or a fine, prosecutors often 
filed multiple charges, which is indicative of severity. With the vignette we 
presented, 84% of prosecutors chose to charge misdemeanors and only 16% clearly 
chose to file felonies.162  
Second, the results from the number of charges and specifically the lack of 
declination was unexpected. Based on prior research we thought, 163  that more 
prosecutors would impose no charges at all. We purposely provided a minor crime 
with little harm actually caused but with a potential for serious crime to be caused, 
by someone with no criminal record and obvious circumstantial difficulties. Yet 
97% of prosecutors in our study chose to charge him, and they charged him on 
average with three separate crimes. In contrast to our observed 3% declination rate, 
prior studies have estimated 25-50% declination rates.164 This is probably the most 
significant finding that could help explain the filing increases we are seeing with 
prosecutors in Part I.B. 
Third, prosecutors imposed nonuniform punishments. Some prosecutors in the 
same region fined a defendant $5,000 dollars and others imposed no fine. Some 
recommended over a year in jail or five years and others imposed community 
service. A few prosecutors recommended no charge, and some recommended up to 
eleven. Overall, the lack of consistency or oversight of prosecutors nationally is 
disturbing.  
This section will discuss the results in more detail.165 Figures 3-5 illustrate the 
results discussed below. 
 
1.  Number of Charges 
 
 
162  Some of the options for charges were clearly misdemeanors and others were 
felonies. The only clear felony was “aggravated assault.” 16% of prosecutors chose to charge 
this crime. However, there were other crimes that prosecutors chose that could have been 
intended as felonies including felony harassment. So, of the 84%, other prosecutors likely 
were choosing to charge misdemeanors, but we cannot be sure. We did not consider these 
charges felonies in a choice to be conservative in the face of uncertainty. See also Robertson 
et al., supra note 35. 
163 See supra notes 119 to 124 and infra 199 to 205 discussing previous studies on 
declination. 
164 See infra notes 208 to 222. 
165 See Robertson et al., supra note 35 where some key results are published. 
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Figure 3 Number of  Charges per Prosecutor
Prosecutors could choose from eight possible charges: disorderly conduct, 
loitering, public nuisance, criminal nuisance, harassment, endangerment, assault, 
and aggravated assault. Prosecutors could select as many charges as they thought 
appropriate, and also indicate if they would file multiple of the same charge. Almost 
97% of prosecutors filed at least one charge. The mean number of charges was 3.16 
[CI 2.98, 3.33], and excluding the 15 prosecutors who declined to bring charges, the 
mean number of charges was 3.26 [CI 3.09, 3.44]. The number of charges ranged 
from 1 to 11 (the maximum number of charges possible was 16). The most common 
number of charges were two (26%), three (20%), and four (15%).  
We also found extremely wide heterogeneity in how prosecutors resolved the 
exact same case. See Figure 3. Although 15 prosecutors resolved the case without 
pressing any charges, the modal respondent imposed two charges, and some 
prosecutors sought seven or more up to 11.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3689242
2.  Felony or Misdemeanor Charge 
 
We examined whether a prosecutor would charge the defendant with a felony 
versus a misdemeanor (or no charge at all).166 Only 16% of prosecutors opted to 
charge the defendant with aggravated assault (the clear felony available), whereas 
84% opted for charges that were a misdemeanor only (or could be either a felony or 
a misdemeanor). So, even though the option was there for prosecutors to charge a 
felony, most chose not to.167  
 
3.  Monetary Penalty Recommendation 
 
We also investigated whether a prosecutor would recommend a monetary 
penalty, and if so, the dollar amount of the penalty. About 41% of prosecutors opted 
to recommend a monetary penalty, whereas 59% opted for no monetary penalty. The 
mean monetary penalty recommended, including all prosecutors who recommended 
no monetary penalty, was $242.75 [CI $191.90, $293.60], or when excluding 
prosecutors who did not recommend a monetary penalty, the mean recommended 
amount was $640.25 [CI $530.77, $749.73]. Of those prosecutors that recommended 
a monetary penalty, the amount recommended ranged from $10 to $5,000, and the 
most common recommended amount was $500 (55/160 prosecutors recommended) 
with common recommendations of $100, $200, $250, $750, and $1,000. See Figure 
4. Although many prosecutors sought no monetary penalty at all, and the modal 
respondent sought $500 or less, some demanded as much as $5,000—showing wide 




166 We also studied whether the charges were dependent on race or socioeconomic 
status of defendant. See Robertson et al, supra note 35 for findings.  
167 One advantage of our study design is that respondents were able to explain the 
reasons for their charging decisions. Many prosecutors took advantage of this opportunity. 
Of these respondents, thirty-five prosecutors said that they might increase or decrease 
charges depending on defendant cooperation. Also, twenty-nine respondents would charge a 
felony but allow defendant to plead to a misdemeanor, three respondents would select 
multiple charges but offer a plea to one felony charge in favor of dropping additional 
misdemeanor charges, five respondents would charge multiple misdemeanors but allow 
defendant to plead to a single misdemeanor charge, and ten respondents would charge 
multiple counts at various levels in order to expand plea options. 
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4.  Confinement Recommendation 
 
Next the study examined whether a prosecutor would recommend a term of 
confinement, and if so, the minimum days of confinement. About 27% of 
prosecutors recommended confinement, whereas 73% opted for no confinement. 
The mean recommended minimum days of confinement, including prosecutors who 
recommended no confinement, was just over 21 (21.40, CI [15.02, 27.79]), or when 
excluding prosecutors who did not recommend confinement, 80.17 days [CI 59.51, 
100.83]. 168  Of those prosecutors that recommended confinement, the minimum 
number of days of confinement recommended ranged from two to 720 days, and the 
most common recommended amount was 30 days (31/122 prosecutors 
recommended) with common recommendations of 10, 90, and 180 days. 
Confinement results are shown in Figure 5 below. Most strikingly, we saw many 
prosecutors resolving the case without any jail time, but others demanding a month, 
or even up to five years in one case. Some of the qualitative responses on 
confinement will be discussed later. 
  
 
168 Id. If nine extreme values are recoded to a maximum value of 95% percentile of the 
distribution, or 180 days, when prosecutors recommend confinement, the mean minimum 
number of days recommended becomes 63.05 [CI 51.15, 74.95]. 
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D.  Discussion of Findings 
 
Our national study of prosecutor decisionmaking illuminates a few key 
findings. Prosecutors charged a crime more often than expected, rarely declined to 
charge, and were harsher with confinement and fines than may be warranted. While 
it might be reassuring that prosecutors only charged the most serious crime 16% of 
the time, given the absence of physical harm and the defendant’s lack of criminal 
history, we were surprised that 97% of prosecutors charged any crime in this 
scenario. And the majority of prosecutors charged between two to four charges.  
It is not just the number of charges that indicate severity. While about 70% of 
prosecutors in our study indicated that confinement was not appropriate, those who 
did recommend confinement most commonly suggested 30 days. To put these 
findings into perspective, thirty days of confinement has the average cost to 
defendant of $11,400 and means a loss of job, family and often housing.169 Of all of 
the prosecutors, 41% recommended a monetary penalty, with the most common fine 
imposed being $500 dollars. The fine of $500 dollars, which is a nice round number 
and may not seem draconian to a white collar professional, is more than the average 
American has in savings.170 These findings could demonstrate that our prosecutors 
may be out of touch with the life circumstances for an average defendant.  
 
169 Shima B. Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. LAW REV. 1 at Table 3 
(2017) (discussing in detail economic studies tallying the costs borne by a defendant during 
incarceration). 
170 Kathryn Vasel, 6 in 10 Americans Don't Have $500 in Savings, CNN MONEY (Jan. 
12, 2017, 8:21 AM), (“Nearly six in 10 Americans don't have enough savings to cover a $500 
or $1,000 unplanned expense . . . .”); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT 
ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2015 1 (2016) (“Forty-six percent 
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We purposely gave prosecutors a scenario that was borderline and potentially 
understandable—a younger defendant having a terrible day (a 20-something-year-
old drinking after a breakup and with no criminal record). It could have involved a 
simple discussion with defendant and attorney and not created a record for 
defendant. However, only 3% of prosecutors declined to charge the defendant with 
any crime. Indeed, almost every prosecutor charged the defendant with a crime and 
the average number of crimes charged was three. What is significant about this is 
that the defendant in this scenario obtains a criminal record that leaves him with 
collateral consequences, sometimes for life (where a felony is charged) and will 
forever impact his job prospects even if the charge is later dropped.171  
Another key finding is that prosecutors demonstrated little uniformity 
nationally as some prosecutors fined defendant $5,000 dollars and others imposed 
no fine. Some recommended five years of prison time and others imposed 
community service. A few prosecutors recommended no charge, and some 
recommended up to eleven. While maintaining individual discretion may be 
important for prosecutors, it may be surprising to the public that their results will be 
so different depending on the prosecutor they happen to encounter. 
Finally, and probably most importantly, the prosecutor decisions we witnessed 
may have parallels in the real world and may impact incarceration rates. It is possible 
that the dramatically low rate of declination and much higher rates of severity and 
punishment we witnessed in our study are also found in real cases these prosecutors 
are deciding. This could indeed explain the higher ratio of prosecutor charging to 
police arrests over the last ten years, discussed in Part I.B. The extremely low 
declination rate by prosecutors (3%) may also be a good indicator that the cases 
being dismissed are for evidentiary or witness reasons discovered later in the case. 
This finding indicates that prosecutors may be declining cases not due to the 
prosecutor’s progressive desire to cut incarceration rates, or due to mercy for 
defendant, but because their case is simply not viable. The fact that prosecutors were 
harsher overall and decline to prosecute much less than anticipated nationally 
supports the idea that prosecutors are a leading contributor to mass incarceration. It 
also supports recent data that prosecutors have not eased up on charging like police 
have eased on arrests—and that despite the reduction in crime, prosecutors continue 
to charge with impunity. The implications of these findings are discussed in more 
detail in Part III.  
  
 
of adults say they could not cover an emergency expense costing $400.”); PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS, WHAT RESOURCES DO FAMILIES HAVE FOR FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES? 1 (2015) 
(“One in 3 American families reports having no savings at all, including 1 in 10 of those with 
incomes of more than $100,000 a year.”). 
171 See discussion of collateral consequences supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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III.  PROSECUTOR IMPACT ON MASS INCARCERATION 
 
We learned through our national study that prosecutors may be harsher, less 
uniform and less likely to decline cases than we might have expected. There are 
many ways to further understand these findings. One approach would be to reconcile 
prosecutor actions with anticipated behavior to understand whether prosecutors are 
acting appropriately given public expectations. Another approach would be to 
consider the typical prosecutor punishment and examine whether it is fitting for the 
crime, in terms of punishment theory. Yet another approach is to understand 
prosecutor actions and compare them to how scholars might predict prosecutors to 
act in this situation, given the various theories of prosecutor action. Another 
potential approach would be a prescriptive one—we know what is wrong with 
prosecutors, so how do we begin to fix it? While all of these approaches are 
important and should be undertaken in time, the first question we want to ask is 
whether prosecutors generally acted lawfully and appropriately. In essence, did 
prosecutors get it right? 
To determine whether prosecutors were generally on the right track, we 
compare their actions to the leading national prosecutor standards—American Bar 
Association (ABA) and National District Attorneys Association (NDAA)—and 
Supreme Court guidance on prosecutorial discretion. ABA and NDAA standards 
provide guidance for state prosecutors nationwide on all aspects of their duties,172 
and are the most widely accepted national standards for prosecutor behavior.173 
Judging prosecutors by publicly accepted standards and Supreme Court precedent—
though still subjective—creates a generally accepted basis by which to consider 
prosecutor behavior. We recognize that some prosecutors operate under internal 
guidelines or personal standards that may trump the standards indicated below.174  
This section explores whether prosecutor behavior is aligned with governing 
standards and caselaw and how their decisions impact mass incarceration. In order 
to answer this question, we break down the empirical findings of Part II into three 
categories—the decision to charge or not to charge, the severity of the charge, and 
the uniformity of prosecutor decisions. Part III.A discusses the national guidance on 
the decision to charge or not charge a crime. Part III.B reviews the guidance on 
severity and Part III.C discusses the guidance on uniformity. Part III.D covers the 
implications of all of these standards regarding prosecutors, the lack of transparency, 
 
172 See ABA STANDARD, supra note 40. 
173 The ABA, the largest organization of attorneys and sets forth prosecution guidelines. 
See ABA STANDARD, supra note 40. The National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) 
is the “oldest and largest national, nonpartisan organization representing state and local 
prosecutors in the country. Formed in 1950, NDAA has more than 5,500 members across the 
nation representing state and local prosecutors’ offices from both urban and rural districts, 
as well as large and small jurisdictions.” See www.ndaa.org/about; see also NATIONAL 
DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 10 (3d ed. 
updated 2009) (hereinafter NDAA STANDARD). 
174 We must address these issues about prosecutors’ internal guidelines in a forthcoming 
piece. 
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and the effects of prosecutor decisions on mass incarceration and provides two 
important conclusions. First, in examining Supreme Court precedent and major 
prosecutor guidelines—prosecutors are completely within their purview and even 
arguably best practices in their charging decisions. In other words, there are not even 
loose recommendations against the severity or disparity in charging we witnessed in 
our study. Second, and most importantly, prosecutor’s decisions are critical to mass 
incarceration. Given the lack of data or transparency in charging, prosecutors are 
likely unaware that their individual decisions are collectively causing mass 
incarceration in America. 
 
A.  The Charging Decision 
 
The first question is what guidance Supreme Court or prosecutor standards give 
prosecutors on charging or declining to charge in a given case. National 
prosecutorial standards seem to expect much more of prosecutors than average 
attorneys yet emphasize their discretion. The ABA and NDAA make clear that their 
standards are “aspirational” or “best practices” and are not intended to serve as a 
basis of imposing “discipline” or serving as a “predicate for a motion to . . . dismiss 
a charge.” 175  The NDAA recognizes that the decision to charge is the “most 
important” made by prosecutors in the exercise of their discretion. 176  NDAA 
recognizes that it may put into play the amorphous “prosecutor’s beliefs regarding 
the criminal justice system.”177 The ABA states that a prosecutor should exercise 
“sound discretion” in performing her function.178  
The ABA affirms that the primary duty of a prosecutor is “to seek justice within 
the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.”179 Likewise, the NDAA states that the 
primary responsibility of a prosecutor is to “seek justice.” 180  Scholars have 
recognized that prosecutors have very little guidance as to what it means to “seek 
justice.”181 This phrase is purposely vague, and has been interpreted differently by 
 
175 ABA STANDARD 3-1.1(b) The NDAA similarly points out that if someone does not 
follow the guidelines, it “may or may not constitute an unacceptable lack of 
professionalism.” NDAA STANDARD at 10 “These standards are not intended to: (a) be used 
by the judiciary in determining whether a prosecutor committed error or engaged in improper 
conduct; (b) be used by disciplinary agencies when passing upon allegations of violations of 
rules of ethical conduct; (c) create any right of action in any person; or (d) alter existing law 
in any respect.” 
176 NDAA STANDARD 4-1.8 Commentary. 
177 Id. 
178 ABA STANDARD 3-1.2(a). 
179 ABA STANDARD 3-1.2(b). 
180 NDAA STANDARD 1-1.1. 
181 Bellin, supra note 34, at 105 (remarking that prosecutors are not told what it means 
to “seek justice”); R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can 
Teach Us About A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
635, 637 (2006) (same); Daniel S. Medwed, supra note 26, at 35, 43; Fred C. Zacharias, 
Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 
VAND. L. REV. 45, 58 (1991).  
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different scholars, and prosecutors.182 For some prosecutors, obtaining convictions 
has been the definition of seeking justice.183 As Bellin argues, “seeking justice” is 
an “analytical dead end” because justice is not concrete enough to create rules for 
how discretion should be used.184  
The Supreme Court has been very deferential to prosecutors in using their 
discretion—and has affirmed the “seek justice” principles of prosecutor guidelines. 
In Berger v. United States, the Court described a prosecutor as a “servant of the law” 
and made clear that in that role the prosecutor is not that it “shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.”185 The Supreme Court has made very clear that the number of 
charges,186 “[w]hether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring . . . are decisions 
that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.” 187  The Court explained in 
McClesky v. Kemp that “discretion is essential to the criminal justice process” and 
that “clear proof” would be required to infer that a prosecutor has abused this 
discretion.188 The Supreme Court has always supported a decision of a prosecutor to 
refuse to prosecute in a given case.189 Courts, as well as prosecutor guidelines, have 
described prosecutors as representatives of an impartial government and have 
 
182 Green, Seek Justice, supra note 26, at 607, 608 (describing the duty to “seek justice” 
as ill-defined, protean, and vague); Ross Galin, Above the Law: The Prosecutor’s Duty to 
Seek Justice and the Performance of Substantial Assistance Agreements, 68 FORD. L. REV. 
1245, 1266 (2000) (“‘[S]eek justice,’ however, is vague and leaves a great deal of latitude 
for individual interpretation.”); Fred C. Zacharias, supra note 181, at 45, 48 (“The ‘do 
justice’ standard, however, establishes no identifiable norm. Its vagueness leaves prosecutors 
with only their individual sense of morality to determine just conduct.”); David Aaron, Note, 
Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Nonevidentiary 
Information, 67 FORD. L. REV. 3005, 3026 (1999) (noting that the ethical standards provide 
very few specific duties of the prosecutor). 
183 Dr. George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 S.W. U. L. REV. 98, 
109 (1975) (one third of prosecutors in this empirical study noted that their primary job was 
obtaining convictions) 
184 Bellin, supra note 34, at 108; Griffin, supra note 27, at 259, 307; Nugent-Borakove, 
supra note 27. One scholar argues the ABA standards do not provide any limits. Melilli, 
supra note 17, at 681 (“The recommended threshold of the ABA Prosecution Standards—
sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction—is likewise far too easily satisfied to 
provide any real limitation upon, or incentive to exercise, case-specific evaluation by the 
prosecutor.”). 
185 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
186 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 126 (1979). 
187 Id. at 123-24. 
188 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 280 (1987). 
189 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985) (discussing prosecutorial 
refusal to charge due to the judiciary’s respect for prosecutorial decisionmaking); 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978) (“[Th]e decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in [the 
prosecutor’s] discretion.”). 
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assumed that they are held to a higher standard than other attorneys.190 This higher 
standard is accompanied by a much higher level of discretion. 
When it comes to declining cases, national prosecution standards are somewhat 
agnostic. ABA standards make clear that a prosecutor “is not obliged to file or 
maintain all criminal charges which the evidence might support.”191 It also makes 
clear that the prosecutor’s discretion includes the ability to “initiate, decline, or 
dismiss a criminal charge.”192  The ABA, while acknowledging that declination 
might occur within a prosecutor’s discretion, does not encourage it.193 The ABA 
standards certainly go further than the NDAA standards. NDAA states that the 
prosecutor should decide whether initial charges should be pursued, 194  and 
encourages a prosecutor’s office to “retain record of the reasons for declining a 
prosecution.”195 However, when discussing charges, the NDAA standards typically 
consider what charges would be appropriate for the offense or “serve the interests of 
justice” rather than considering whether charges should be made at all.196 Neither 
 
190 People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800 (overruled on other grounds); see also Galin, supra 
note 182 at 1255 (“The unmistakable message contained in these norms is that prosecutors 
are held to a different, and arguably higher, ethical standard than are private lawyers.”); 
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 214–215, 233 (1990) 
(prosecutors have a “distinctive role in the administrative justice” and have different 
responsibilities than other attorneys); Green, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 26 at 595–
96 (Prosecutors do not have clients—but represent “the people, the state, and the 
government”). 
191 ABA STANDARD 3-4.4 (listing some of the factors to consider as: (i) the strength of 
the case; (ii) the prosecutor’s doubt that the accused is in fact guilty; (iii) the extent or absence 
of harm caused by the offense;(iv) the impact of prosecution or non-prosecution on the public 
welfare; (v) the background and characteristics of the offender, including any 
voluntary restitution or efforts at rehabilitation; (vi) whether the authorized or likely 
punishment or collateral consequences are disproportionate in relation to the particular 
offense or the offender; (vii) the views and motives of the victim or complainant; (viii) any 
improper conduct by law enforcement; (ix) unwarranted disparate treatment of similarly 
situated persons; (x) potential collateral impact on third parties, including witnesses or 
victims; (xi) cooperation of the offender in the apprehension or conviction of others; (xii) the 
possible influence of any cultural, ethnic, socioeconomic or other improper biases; (xiii) 
changes in law or policy; (xiv) the fair and efficient distribution of limited prosecutorial 
resources; (xv) the likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction; and (xvi) whether the 
public’s interests in the matter might be appropriately vindicated by available civil, 
regulatory, administrative, or private remedies.) 
192 ABA STANDARD 3-4.4  
193  ABA STANDARD 3-1.2(f) and (e). The ABA only goes so far as encouraging 
prosecutors to develop “alternatives to prosecution or conviction,” to solve broader criminal 
justice problems. 
194 NDAA STANDARD 4-1.1 (2009) (if law allows law enforcement to initiate, the 
prosecutor should still “decide whether the charges should be pursued”). 
195 NDAA STANDARD 4-1.7 (where allowed by law). 
196  NDAA STANDARD 4-2.4 Commentary (“The charging decision entails 
determination of the following issues: What possible charges are appropriate to the offense 
or offenses; and What charge or charges would best serve the interests of justice?”) 
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standard ever points out that potentially declining to charge may help reduce 
unnecessary cases, costs, pretrial detention or collateral consequences that cause 
mass incarceration.197 As a whole, neither approach views declination of charges as 
a positive move for prosecutor offices, defendants or the public. 
Indeed, while some scholars have recognized declination as an important step 
to reducing prison rates,198 many argue that declination presents a wide variety of 
problems.199 Miller and Wright opine on declinations: “Declinations, hidden from 
all traditional legal review yet fundamental to the operation of American criminal 
justice systems, provide the ultimate test of whether reasoned judgments or random 
choices best describe the day-to-day work of criminal prosecutors.” 200  Some 
 
197 O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t, supra note 123 (“[D]eclination policies have both 
pragmatic, as well as aspirational, components.”) 
198 Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1353 (2003) (noting a prosecutor’s “power to be lenient” permits 
mercy, and it avoids flooding the system”); O’Neill, supra note 123, at 255–59 (discussing 
that budget restraints may call for prosecutorial declination)  
199 Murray, supra note 27 (describing nonenforcement as a means to nullification of 
opposed laws); Roger Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 243, 1253 
(2011); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
671, 675–78 (2014) (“categorical” nonenforcement policies presumptively invalid); Robert 
J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration's Nonenforcement of 
Immigration Laws, The Dream Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 
(2013) (examining executive nonenforcement decisions as “effectively repealing” laws); 
Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and Marijuana Law 
Reform: The Search for A Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 183, 185 (2016) 
(viewing prosecutorial discretion as the power to invalidate certain laws); Leigh Osofsky, 
The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX. L. REV. 73, 75–76, 131–32 (2015) 
(supporting prosecutorial declination in some circumstances); Peter J. Henning, 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713 (1999) 
(demonstrating disfavor for selective prosecution—or declination of the law in certain cases). 
200 Miller & Wright, supra note 30, at 3 (relying on a 10-year database of detailed 
prosecutor declination decisions in New Orleans between “1988 and 1999 covering 430,000 
charges and about 280,000 cases (involving 145,000 defendants”). There were a total of 
217,267 charge declinations. We have to look at this number very carefully. Of the total of 
217,267 declined charges, in around 132,000 charges the prosecutors declined to prosecute. 
Of these cases, prosecutors were prosecuting other charges 37.8% of the time (or 85,091 
charges, 18.4% of the time the victim would not testify or could not be located (41,520 cases), 
the testimony was insufficient to support the charge around 10.5% of the time (23,606), it 
was not suitable for prosecution 9.8% of the time (21,961) and other misc. reasons supported 
the rest of the 18% or so of declinations. See Miller et al., supra note 30, at Table 1. There 
are very practical reasons prosecutors decided not to move forward with these cases. Even 
considering the legitimate reasons above, only 45,000 cases or so remain and are covered by 
other legitimate reasons like an insufficient nexus, faulty evidence, an unlawful search, 
aggregated charges, a good defense, and so on. The point of all of this is that cases were not 
declined for reasons someone might consider, like a prosecutor deciding that the law was 
unfair or because the defendant was poor or sympathetic in some other way. It is difficult to 
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scholars see declination as a potential reversal of the rule of law, and worry that it 
may be happening often.201 Indeed some have argued that declinations are on the 
rise lately.202 While there is little evidence of this being a problem, there may be fear 
that prosecutors will refuse to protect the law and public.203 Scholars see the power 
prosecutors have in declining cases—and it seems to be viewed negatively.204  
Our study results track national guidance on declination and contradict the 
perception among scholars that declinations are common or on the rise. The 
prosecutors in our study rarely chose to decline to prosecute cases. Our declination 
rate was only 3%, as 97% of the time the prosecutors charged at least one crime. 
Previous localized work on prosecutor declination estimates that prosecutors decline 
to prosecute anywhere from 25% to 52% of cases.205 But all previous studies of 
declination are retrospective; that is, previous studies lack the ability to see what the 
prosecutor would charge initially, rather than whether a prosecutor ultimately 
charges the case.206 Our study, in contrast, tracks the initial charging decision. We 
were able to consider whether a prosecutor would like to charge a case—before the 
realities of poor evidence or uncooperative witnesses come to bare. This provides an 
insight into the preference of a prosecutor, which in our study is to charge a 
defendant in almost every instance. This is not to say that our prosecutors did not 
 
figure out the percentage declination in the Miller study. However, given that there are 
145,000 defendants and around 132,000 declined charges (and presumably 298,000 charges), 
the overall declination rate seems quite low but is unclear from the study so no conclusions 
can be drawn on this point. 
201 W. Kerrel Murray, supra note 27, at 3 (“no one doubts that prosecutors sometimes 
may thwart the law’s application where, by its letter, it would govern.”) 
202 See Murray, supra note 27 at 3; Jessica Roth, Prosecutorial Declination Statements, 
110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. at 482; See Benjamin Weiser, Should Prosecutors Chastise Those 
They Don’t Charge?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017) (claiming there is an “apparent trend” of 
prosecutor declination). 
203 Murray has posed the question of how often prosecutors might nullify the law and 
discusses some problems with this scenario. Murray supra note 27, at 3 (“The question is 
how far “sometimes” goes. As the opening examples show, prosecutors are beginning to 
stretch their power beyond mine-run resource-driven nonenforcement and one-off ex post 
declinations in “anomalous cases” of factual guilt.”) 
204 Murray, supra note 27, at 3. 
205 Ronald Wright and Marc Miller find that the New Orleans District Attorney’s office 
over a ten-year period from 1988 to 1999 filed criminal charges in 46% of all cases 
recommended to them and rejected “for prosecution in state felony court 52% of all cases 
and 63% of all charges.” Bellin, Reassessing, supra note 56, at 846; see also Wright & Miller, 
supra note 43, at 74. Prosecutors note that they declined an “exceptional” number of cases 
and acknowledged that New Orleans is a unique jurisdiction in other ways, including that 
they plea bargain 60-70% of cases (rather than over 90%) and go to trial much more than 
other jurisdictions. Id. at 65. See also VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 119; Donald M. 
McIntyre & David Lippmann, Prosecutors and Early Disposition of Felony Cases, 56 
A.B.A. J. 1154, 1156-57 (1970). And see discussion in Part I.A. 
206 Compare supra note 43 for discussion of Wright study. 
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envision that charges would be dropped, or sentences suspended,207  but it does 
demonstrate that prosecutors saw it their duty to charge a crime when they witnessed 
one. Prosecutors were thus in line with strict national standards on charging and 
declination. 
 
B.  Severity in Charging 
 
The Supreme Court and national prosecutor guidelines are surprisingly silent 
on prosecutor severity. We have heard very little from any of these sources on what 
constitutes inappropriate harshness when it comes to charging decisions. The 
Supreme Court—just in the last few years has finally demonstrated that there is some 
bar against severe charging.  
Starting with national prosecutor standards, there is very little guidance on 
charging severity. While NDAA standards encourage prosecutors to “screen 
potential charges to eliminate from the criminal justice system those cases where 
prosecution is not justified or not in the public interest,”208 they do not encourage 
prosecutors to consider the severity of the punishment as compared to the harm 
caused.209 When it comes to severity and declinations, the ABA standards declare 
that “[t]he prosecutor serves the public interest and should act with integrity and 
balanced judgment to increase public safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal 
charges of appropriate severity, and by exercising discretion to not pursue criminal 
charges in appropriate circumstances.” 210  Unfortunately these standards do not 
clarify what “appropriate severity” means.211  
None of the standards encourage prosecutors to charge just one crime when 
multiple charges could be considered. 212  Nowhere in the standards does it ask 
prosecutors to consider no charge at all, particularly when considering an individual 
without a criminal record, or potentially placing a higher bar in this circumstance. 
 
207 Indeed, some prosecutors indicate that they are planning to drop charges as part of 
the plea bargaining process. See Wright et al, supra note 155; see also supra notes 22–24 
and Robertson et al., supra note 35 at Table 1. 
208 NDAA Standard 4-1.3 
209 The closest these standards get is encouraging the prosecutor to consider available 
civil remedies. NDAA Standard 4-1.3(d).  
210 ABA STANDARD 3-1.2(b) 
211  Green, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 26 at 606 (2019) (“no established 
vocabulary for judging prosecutors’ exercise of discretion”); Thomas, supra note 26, at 1043, 
1057–58 (theorizing about the inconsistency of charging standards across hypothetical 
districts); Gershman, supra note 26, at 151, 152 (comparing the more strict and hierarchical 
prosecutorial system of Germany to that of the U.S.); Green, Seek Justice, supra note 26 at 
607 (noting what qualifies as an “abuse of discretion” has not been “squarely answered”); 
Medwed, supra note 26, at 35, 42 (relying on “justice” as prosecutor’s main guiding principle 
is “problematic because of the term's inherent vagueness”); Bresler, supra note 26, at 1301 
(arguing that ABA language used in establishing ethical standards “degenerates into 
malarkey upon closer examination”); Green & Levine, supra note 26, at 143, 151 (describing 
the ABA ethics rules as “non-enforceable guidelines”). 
212 See generally NDAA Standards (2009) 
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Nowhere in the standards are prosecutors advised not to charge the most severe 
charge possible. Nowhere do the standards indicate the careful consideration a 
prosecutor should make due to the impact of even a short prison stint on an 
individual’s life. While scholars have emphasized the importance of prosecutors not 
charging the harshest punishment possible for the particular crime, 213  national 
prosecutor standards have not determined the bar for severity in punishment. 
The Supreme Court’s limits on sentence severity originate from the dictates of 
the Magna Carta and Eighth Amendment.”214 According to the Supreme Court, the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are “grossly disproportionate.”215 To 
determine disproportionality, the Court measures “the relationship between the 
nature and number of offenses committed and the severity of the punishment 
inflicted upon the offender,”216 although the Supreme Court has made clear that the 
Eight Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause applies only a “narrow 
proportionality principle” when it comes to noncapital sentences.217  
The Supreme Court has rarely struck down a sentence for severity.218  For 
instance, in Rummel v. Estelle, the Court held that prosecutors did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment for charging and sentencing a three-time criminal offender to 
life in prison without parole.219 Also, the Supreme Court has upheld a defendant’s 
sentence to forty years in prison for possession with intent to distribute nine ounces 
of marijuana.220 Though the Court has mentioned that even if punishment does not 
serve a utilitarian function, it is important to consider whether the person “deserves 
such punishment.”221 The example the Court gives of “gross disproportionate” is a 
“mandatory life sentence for overtime parking.”222 A life sentence for a parking 
 
213 Green, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 26, at 589, 599 (arguing the theory that 
people should not be punished as harshly as the law permits is essential to the U.S. system); 
Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice, 90 N.C. L. REV. 101, 117–25 (2012) 
(advocating for proportionality review with respect to penal severity). 
214 Magna Carta of 1215 (The principle of proportionality derives from the Magna Carta 
which insures “[a] free man shall not be [fined] for a trivial offence”); See Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U. S. 86 (1958) (opinion of Warren, C.J.) (Eighth Amendment is measured by “evolving 
standards of decency.”) 
215 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 –85 (1980). 
216 Id. at 288. 
217 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–97 (1991). 
218 Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 187–88 (1957) (discussing prosecution as “an 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal” which causes an individual to experience “anxiety and 
insecurity,” see also Currier v. Virginia, 292 Va. 737, 798 S.E. 2d 164 (2018) (affirming the 
ordeal of the criminal trial).  
McDonnough v. Smith, 588 U. S. _ (2019) at 5, n.2; W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, 
& D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS §119, 870 (5th ed. 1984) (“[O]ne who 
is wrongfully prosecuted may suffer both in reputation and by confinement”) 
219 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284 –85. 
220 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 379–80 (1982) 
221 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288. 
222 Id. 
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violation seems to demonstrate the limit of a prosecutor’s charging power—showing 
that it is nearly unlimited as far as severity. 
The Supreme Court has made clear that harsh charges are not a problem and 
that only illegal or inappropriate charges are prohibited. For instance, the Supreme 
Court has made it clear that prosecutors can “may exercise their discretion” to charge 
a felony or misdemeanor, when either charge is permissible.223 Indeed, it has gone 
further to state that the Court is a not a “super-legislature” with a duty to “second-
guess legislative policy choices.” 224  United States v. Berger also states that a 
prosecutor may “prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, 
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”225 The Court 
arguably envisions a prosecutor being tough. Maybe charging several crimes when 
one charge is possible constitutes a “hard blow”—which is permissible. Overall, the 
Supreme Court has historically approved of severe sentences as long as they are not 
grossly disproportionate—which seems to be a very low bar.226 
However, in a few recent cases, the Supreme Court hinted that the status quo 
of charging the most severe sentence possible may not be acceptable anymore.227 In 
Yates v. United States, during oral arguments, the government attorney argued that 
his understanding of the guidance provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Manual is that 
“the prosecutor should charge . . . the offense that’s the most severe under the law. 
That’s not a hard and fast rule, but that's kind of the default principle.”228 Justice 
Scalia then responded, “[w]ell, if that’s going to be the Justice Department’s 
position, then we’re going to have to be much more careful about how extensive 
statutes are. I mean, if you’re saying we’re always going to prosecute the most 
 
223 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 1, 28–291 (2003) (California prosecutors can charge 
“wobblers” as either a felony or misdemeanor based on defendant’s record). 
224 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003). 
225 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. at 88 (1935). 
226 Additionally, in Bond v. United States, in a rare move, the Court second guessed 
federal prosecutors in using their discretion. The Supreme Court questioned a specific prison 
sentence against Bond for a chemical weapons offense which demonstrated a displacement 
of “public policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, enacted in its capacity as 
sovereign.” Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014). Since this is a case about a federal 
prosecutor and invokes federalism it could be an exception. However, this case can also 
signify a move towards greater oversight by courts of prosecutors in general. 
227 Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528 (2015) (striking down a six-year sentence). 
228 Yates v. U.S. Oral Arg. Tr., 28-30, Nov. 5. 2014. See also Bond v. U.S. Oral Arg. 
Tr., 37, Nov. 5, 2013 (the Court striking down a 6-year sentence for a federal “chemical 
weapons” charge against a woman for trying to injure her husband’s mistress by putting 
chemicals on her doorknobs. Justice Alito said in argument “If you told ordinary people that 
you were going to prosecute Ms. Bond for using a chemical weapon, they would be 
flabbergasted. It’s—it—it’s so far outside of the ordinary meaning of the word.” Bond v. U.S. 
Oral Arg. Tr., 37, Nov. 5, 2013. Justice Kennedy also questions the prosecutor bringing this 
charge: “It also seems unimaginable that you would bring this prosecution. But let’s leave 
that.” Bond v. U.S. Oral Arg. Tr., 28, Nov. 5, 2013.  
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severe, I’m going to be very careful about how severe I make statutes.”229 The 
government then backtracks and argues that is not right and that the government is 
“not always going to prosecute every case, and obviously we’re going to exercise 
our discretion.”230 Later Justice Scalia laments the extreme charge: “What kind of a 
mad prosecutor would try to send this guy up for 20 years or risk sending him up for 
20 years?”231 The Supreme Court reversed the sentence interpreting the criminal 
statute differently than the government.  
This exchange in Yates illustrates a few important points. The government 
seems to acknowledge that the rule of federal prosecutors is to charge the most 
severe crime possible and this is supported clearly by the U.S. Attorney’s Manual.232 
But the Supreme Court seems to indicate that at least in this instance, it is not 
supportive of this general rule. Although this is the Court opining on a federal statute 
charged by federal prosecutors, this could signal a trend among courts that charging 
the most severe statute will not be acceptable—even for state prosecutors.233 
If applying Supreme Court and national guidelines, our study prosecutors 
would likely be deemed to have used their discretion appropriately—and even 
arguably be within best practices of prosecutors. Though there was great 
heterogeneity that makes it difficult to generalize. As a reminder, 30% of our study 
prosecutors recommended jail time for an individual with no criminal record and 
who seems to need short-term therapy or a cooling-down period. The average 
prosecutor recommending confinement charged three crimes and sought 30 days in 
jail, which would likely result in this individual losing his job, and likely stable 
housing and family life. The severity in fines we witnessed from prosecutors also 
did not contradict their national guidelines. Recall that $500 was the most common 
fine imposed for this situation, where no victim was injured, and no property was 
damaged. Broad surveys of the U.S. population show that six out of ten Americans 
do not have $500 in savings, which suggests that this fine amount may be onerous.234 
It would certainly be an amount an average fast food worker would be unlikely to 
be able to pay, leading to other serious criminal justice implications for an arguably 
minor offense.235 
It is compelling that a national sample of prosecutors universally charged, and 
in some instances recommended a significant jail term for an individual who has 
certainly made a serious mistake, has not caused any physical harm or property 
 
229 Yates v. U.S. Oral Arg. Tr., 28-30, Nov. 5. 2014. See also Justice Breyer’s concern 
about arbitrary enforcement, Yates v. U.S. Oral Arg. Tr., 36, Nov. 5. 2014. 
230 Yates v. U.S. Oral Arg. Tr., 28-30, Nov. 5. 2014. 
231 Yates v. U.S. Oral Arg. Tr., 28, Nov. 5. 2014. 
232  THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, US ATTORNEY MANUAL 9-27.300 (2020) (“As 
stated, a Federal prosecutor should initially charge the most serious, readily provable offense 
or offenses consistent with the defendant's conduct.”). 
233 Reviewing state court limits on prosecution would be helpful to determine what 
differences exist in state severity limits. 
234 See supra note 170. 
235 In one of our conditions, the defendant was a fast food worker. See Part II. 
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damage, and does not have the risk factors of future violence.236 Even aside from the 
effects on defendants and their families, such incarceration also imposes onerous 
financial costs on the government—amounting to $45,000 per year in some 
jurisdictions.237 Indeed, 8% of prosecutors of the prosecutors in our study wrote 
qualitative comments justifying their punishment recommendations along the lines 
of a “few days in jail would do good” for the accused. This contradicts evidence 
showing the opposite effect of even short stints in jail.238 The costs borne by the 
prosecutor for these sentences is nothing, and in fact some scholars would argue that 
prosecutors are “rewarded” for creating more prisoners and harmed in their career 
by being too lenient.239 But the cost to the defendant may be devastating.240 
Even though our prosecutors recognized that the crime was minor, they did not 
consider the devastating effect of criminal charges. One 55-year old respondent’s 
entire reasoning for their recommended sentence and fine summarizes it best: “no 
big deal.”241 Yes, the crime is truly no big deal—but the consequences defendant is 
left with are life-altering. Any criminal charges and few days in jail can even have 
devastating effects on an individual’s life. Overall, prosecutors in our study did not 
indicate through their written comments that they were sensitive to the potential 
severity of their decisions and recommendations, and they had little reason to be 
given the national guidance they operate under. Indeed, unlike federal prosecutors 
who are encouraged to charge the most severe charges possible, state prosecutors 
are not instructed to do anything similar, but their actions seem to indicate that this 
is their unwritten rule.  
Overall, in examining Supreme Court precedent and major prosecutor 
guidelines—we learn that our study prosecutors are completely within their purview 
in charging and even arguably applying best practices. In other words, there are not 
even loose recommendations against such severity in sentencing. The fact that there 
are not standards prohibiting the type of prosecutor charging we see in our study 
may demonstrate the real problem. And given the lack of data or transparency in 
charging, prosecutors are likely unaware that their individual decisions are 
collectively critical to increasing mass incarceration. Indeed, ABA, NDAA and 
Supreme Court precedent say nothing about exercising restraint in prosecutorial 
 
236 Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 497, 
530 (2012) (demonstrating empirically that individuals who have three or more convictions 
for violent crimes are at a high risk for future violent crimes). 
237  CHRIS MAI & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: EXAMINING STATE 
SPENDING TRENDS 8 (2017) (reporting that the cost of confinement per inmate ranges from 
$14,780 (Alabama) to $69,355 (California) with the average cost per state at $33,274). 
238 See Shima Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. 947, 950 (2019) 
(“Any jail time even for a less serious crime leads to loss of a job, increased recidivism risk, 
and other devastating effects on defendants’ lives.”). 
239 BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS, infra note 271 and accompanying text. 
240 Average cost to defendant of a criminal charge and incarceration is high. See supra 
note 170. 
241 This prosecutor was born in 1965, and works in Region 6 (Alabama, Kentucky, 
Mississippi or Tennessee). 
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charging though they do emphasize even handedly applying punishments. Though 
the Supreme Court has cast a doubt on the unlimited nature of prosecutorial 
discretion in the last ten years,242 there has been no guidance that would prohibit 
prosecutors from charging vigorously more crimes than they need to. And only 
criminal sentences brought by federal statutes have been struck down for severity, 
not state statutes, which are likely to receive more deference.243 Federal guidelines 
actually encourage charging the most serious crime possible. If we are to make a 
dent in mass incarceration, we must examine guidance for prosecutors to determine 
if severity is what we really want. 
The next section considers guidance on uniformity in charging and compares it 
to our study results. 
 
C.  Uniformity in Charging 
 
The Supreme Court and national prosecutor guidelines make it clear that 
uniformity is an important principle. Indeed, similarly situated defendants should be 
treated the same. Our study however, demonstrated the opposite with remarkable 
variability in sentencing. 
The Supreme Court has expressed the importance of uniformity of treatment of 
defendants but made clear that prosecutors are not failing to use discretion 
appropriately when defendants receive disparate charges. The Supreme Court has 
reiterated that the Constitution “requires that all persons subjected to ... legislation 
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges 
conferred and in the liabilities imposed.”244 Indeed, in recent years, the Supreme 
Court has shown a slightly less deferential view towards prosecutorial discretion. It 
has specifically expressed concerns about uniformity of prosecutor power. The 
Court in McDonnell v. United States and Marinello v. United States made clear that 
statutes that provide prosecutors too much power with “abstract general” language 
 
242 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 37 (2010) (disagreeing with a prosecutor’s 
interpretation stating “‘[r]ather than construing the statute in a manner that leaves its outer 
boundaries ambiguous’ . . . we read the statute ‘as limited in scope . . . .’”); Bond v. United 
States, 572 U.S. 844, 19 (2014) (“[I]n its zeal to prosecute [], the Federal Government has 
‘displaced’ the public policy of [] Pennsylvania, [] that Bond does not belong in prison.”); 
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015), 18-19 (relying on the rule of lenity to ‘strike[] 
the appropriate balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining 
criminal liability.’”); McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. ___ (2016), (“The Court in Sun-
Diamond declined to rely on ‘the Government’s discretion’ to protect against overzealous 
prosecutions . . . .”). 
243 Due to federalism dictates, it is likely that state prosecutors applying state criminal 
codes will receive more deference in the criminal context than federal prosecutors applying 
federal laws. 
244 Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008). 
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are not permitted. 245  This risks a prosecutor “purs[ing] their personal 
predilections . . . which could result in the nonuniform execution of that power 
across time and geographic location.”246 The Supreme Court—at least generally—
is in support of uniform execution of prosecutorial power, though mere claims of 
disparate treatment are generally not actionable, even where the disparate treatment 
tracks a protected class such as race.247 
Both the ABA and NDAA prosecution standards make clear that uniformity is 
important in prosecutorial charging.248 NDAA standards specifically warn against 
an accused “receiving substantially different treatment because the case was 
assigned to one individual in the office and not to another.”249 Among NDAA factors 
prosecutors are to consider in screening potential charges include “charging 
decisions made for similarly-situated defendants.”250 One of the ABA standards 
considering charging specifically notes “unwarranted disparate treatment of 
similarly situated persons.”251 While ABA standards mention “reasonable” training 
for prosecutors with periodic review of office policies, there is no mention of a 
training or review to ensure uniformity of charging.252 While the Supreme Court and 
prosecutor standards make clear that charging and sentencing of defendants should 
 
245  Marinello v. U.S., 584 U.S. ___ (2018), 1108 (“rely[ing] upon prosecutorial 
discretion to narrow the otherwise wide-ranging scope of a criminal statute's highly abstract 
general statutory language places great power in the hands of the prosecutor”) and, 
McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. ___ (2016), 2372-73 (slip op., at 23) (we “cannot 
construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will ‘use it responsibly.’”) 
246  Marinello v. U.S., 584 U.S. at 1109 (Recognizing the public fear of “arbitrary 
prosecution,” it undermines necessary confidence in the criminal justice system) (emphasis 
added). 
247 See ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 37. 
248 NDAA STANDARD 1-5.4 Commentary (2009) (Standard 4-1.2 encourages the chief 
prosecutor to recognize the importance of the initial charging decision and provide 
“appropriate training and guidance to prosecutors regarding the exercise of their discretion”); 
ABA STANDARD 3-4.4 (ix). 
249 NDAA STANDARD 1-5.4 Commentary (2009). 
250 NDAA STANDARD 4-1.3(i) (2009) 
251 ABA STANDARD 3-4.4 (ix) 
252  ABA STANDARD 3-1.13 (a)-(d) (noting in (b) “In addition to knowledge of 
substantive legal doctrine and courtroom procedures, a prosecutor’s core training curriculum 
should address the overall mission of the criminal justice system. A core training curriculum 
should also seek to address: investigation, negotiation, and litigation skills; compliance with 
applicable discovery procedures; knowledge of the development, use, and testing of forensic 
evidence; available conviction and sentencing alternatives, reentry, effective conditions of 
probation, and collateral consequences; civility, and a commitment to professionalism; 
relevant office, court, and defense policies and procedures and their proper application; 
exercises in the use of prosecutorial discretion; civility and professionalism; appreciation of 
diversity and elimination of improper bias; and available technology and the ability to use 
it.”) 
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be uniform, we recognize that some scholars do not necessarily believe that 
uniformity of punishment is an important or achievable goal.253 
When we compare these standards to our study findings, however, we find 
hardly any uniformity of charging. Prosecutors charged similarly situated defendants 
who allegedly committed the same assault to varying terms of five years of prison 
time, six months of jail time, down to thirty days of jail time or community service. 
Similarly, some prosecutors charged defendants hefty fines of up to $5,000 dollars 
and others $500 or much lesser amounts of $250. The range was very large across 
our national sample, and even within geographic regions, and seemed very 
random.254 These findings demonstrate that prosecutorial discretion is indeed broad, 
largely unsupervised, highly variable, and inconsistent. Most of this variation was 
inexplicable. This study demonstrates that for the same crime, individuals repeatedly 
and uniformly receive disparate sentences depending on the prosecutor they interact 
with. And furthermore, there is no change in sight as national guidelines and 
Supreme Court standards prefer uniformity but do not give any details on what this 
looks like, do not make actionable mechanisms to challenge disuniformity, and 
prosecutors do not seem concerned with national guidelines.255 This seems to be left 
to individual states and offices. There is also no leading guidance on the importance 
of maintaining uniformity of punishment for similar defendants. Thus the far end of 
a prosecutor’s discretion is misconduct.256 Prosecution is a local function and lacks 
the centralization or uniformity that other state or federal actors may have.257 In sum, 
even though uniformity is an important universal value for prosecutors, our study 
 
253 Michael Davis, Sentencing: Must Justice Be Even-Handed? LAW & PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 1, No. 1 (Apr. 1982) at 77–117. One scholar believes that other western countries who 
are concerned with pre-conviction equality, the US is not concerned about defendants 
between treated equally before conviction, just after. James Q. Whitman, Equality in 
Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. OF LEGAL ANAL. 121 (2009) 
(“Continental law worries most that accused and suspected persons may suffer disparate 
treatment, while American law worries that convicted persons may suffer disparate 
treatment. This is a striking contrast indeed, which deserves more attention . . .” and at 127, 
(“Contemporary American law has generally chosen to pursue equality by limiting discretion 
during the latter phases of the criminal justice process—especially at decision point (8) on 
my chart (sentencing), but also to some extent at decision points (9) (infliction of 
punishment) and (10) (termination of punishment)”) See also Kay Levine, Should 
Consistency Be Part of the Reform Prosecutor’s Playbook?, 1 HASTINGS J. CRIME & PUNISH. 
169 (2020) (arguing that prosecutorial consistency of process is more important than 
consistency of outcomes for defendants). 
254 We did however observe some correlations that merit further study. White and 
Hispanic prosecutors recommended higher amounts of confinement than black prosecutors. 
Also interesting is that Mountain division prosecutors were harsher when it came to monetary 
penalties compared to New England, Middle Atlantic and West North Central prosecutors. 
Further exploration into the causes of variability are required. 
255 Uniformity can certainly also come from internal guidelines. This aspect of the study 
will be discussed in a future paper. 
256 Green, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 26, at 589, 596. 
257 Id. 
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demonstrates that it is not achieved—as demonstrated by wildly different charging 
practices. 258  While uniformity is certainly valued, there is currently no way to 
implement it nationally. 
 
D.  Mitigating a Prosecutor’s Role in Mass Incarceration 
 
In considering broadly how to mitigate prosecutorial impacts on mass 
incarceration, it is enlightening to consider what prosecutors believe guide their 
decisions. When asked how they approach cases, some prosecutors in our study 
wrote a version of the national prosecutor guidelines—“do justice.” One prosecutor 
wrote, “Just do the right thing. Everything else will take care of itself.” And one 
particularly honest response was, “[u]se discretion, don’t embarrass the office.” 
While prosecutors seem to say the right thing as far as their overall goal, the vague 
national (and likely local) guidance they receive, may encourage them to believe 
that they are acting appropriately. In fact, there is no indication in examining national 
guidelines that our study prosecutors are not completely within their discretion in 
charging three crimes in a minor case and imposing 30 days of incarceration. There 
is no indication from prosecutors that granting a five year sentence for an assault 
violates any Supreme Court principles of proportionality or uniformity. And if 
embarrassing the office is a concern underlying prosecutor decisions, it will likely 
be more embarrassing to charge less and appear soft on crime. What is more, given 
that avoiding severity and ensuring uniformity is not circumscribed by any national 
standard, it may even be expected that some prosecutors would let a defendant off 
with community service while some would charge a year confinement. Because 
discretion is still valuable—due to the alternative being a rigid charging scheme—
we consider how to maintain prosecutor discretion while pushing prosecutors to 
consider their impact on mass incarceration.  
While current national guidelines for prosecutors seem appropriate, examining 
them in light of prosecutor charging may demonstrate that something is missing. We 
learned in Part I.B that prosecutors have not reduced charging commensurate to 
police arrest rates in the last ten years and that this may be impacting mass 
incarceration. Our study also demonstrates that prosecutors are more severe in 
charging, charge more than we might have expected, decline to prosecute many 
fewer cases at the outset, and are not uniform in their decisions. Examining national 
prosecutor guidelines and Supreme Court guidance to prosecutors also demonstrates 
that prosecutors are acting appropriately in charging three crimes for a simple assault 
and imposing a year or more of incarceration, as prosecutors are advised to be 
zealous advocates and severity is not limited. All of this might support an argument 
that we should impose strict charging guidelines for prosecutors. On the other side, 
 
258 While this is by no means conclusive, in our study, prosecutors generally did not 
refer to prosecutor standards when determining whether to charge. Indeed only 0.9% (5) of 
respondents mentioned NDAA standards by name and only one prosecutor mentioned ABA 
standards. Only 2.5% (14) of prosecutors list standards as important—without providing a 
name for the national standards that apply. 
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some prosecutors using their discretion will always interpret guidelines differently 
than others. Is removing discretion the answer? For the reasons articulated below, 
we do not advocate removing prosecutor charging discretion—despite the negative 
impacts individual charging decisions may have. We do believe, however, that at a 
minimum, national and local guidelines should explicitly advise prosecutors not to 
charge the most serious crime possible and to consider the effects of their charging 
decisions on mass incarceration. The Supreme Court has moved in this direction, 
and more explicit guidance to this effect is welcome.  
Indeed, the first reform we suggest is making national guidance explicit that 
prosecutors should limit their impact on mass incarceration. In order for prosecutor 
offices to effectively track impact, data collection by office and region is critical. 
While prosecutors seek justice, they have had no meaningful guidance to consider 
the broader implications of their actions on incarceration. Before our study, it was 
unclear whether prosecutor charging rates were out of step with the reduction of 
crime and reduction of arrests we are seeing nationally. We now see that prosecutors 
may have room to reduce criminal charging, given the reduction of crime and arrests. 
Arming prosecutors with this kind of information itself may influence individual and 
office level prosecutor decisions. Requiring prosecutor offices to consider the costs 
of incarceration to their jurisdiction and to the accused would also be helpful.259 Data 
on charging and costs of charging decisions should be available to prosecutor offices 
in order to consider the broader impacts on mass incarceration. 
The typical response to prosecutorial problems—reduced discretion—may not 
provide the hoped for reductions in mass incarceration.260 As it currently stands, 
most states are much less punitive with crimes than the federal government.261 The 
federal sentencing guidelines removed much discretion from prosecutors with the 
intent of “effective fair sentencing system.” 262  Indeed the guidelines aimed to 
 
259 Baughman, Subconstitutional, supra note 47, at 1071. 
260 Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1087, 1104 (2005) (“Perhaps the only way to remove some of the 
severity [of the existing system] is to allow prosecutors to operate quietly, dispensing mercy 
in a few cases, even if it is done inconsistently); see PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12, at149-
150 (explaining that New Jersey plea bargaining guidelines increases sentencing disparity 
and harshness); Bellin, Reassessing, supra note 56 at 837 (As Bellin astutely points out “[t]he 
prosecutorial charging guidelines and enhanced transparency Locked In champions will not 
reduce incarceration[.]”). 
261  Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: 
Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J.1641, 
1643 (noting the disparity between state and federal law for punishment of gun crimes); 
Christine DeMaso, Sentencing and the Federalization of Crime: Should Federal Sentencing 
Judges Consider the Disparity Between State and Federal Sentences Under Booker?, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2096 (2006) (affirming that “federal penalties are generally higher 
than state penalties”). Though note that state sentences have increased significantly for major 
crimes. See supra note 86. 
262 See U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1.A.3 (2018). Sentencing guidelines 
apply to judges and it is important to note that prosecutors still hold a large amount of 
discretion as to what to charge that would then trigger the mandatory sentencing ranges. 
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“achieve reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the range of sentences 
that could be imposed for similar offenses committed by similar offenders; and to 
seek proportionality in sentencing by imposing different sentences.”263 However, 
unfortunately the goals of uniformity and proportionality were not met by federal 
sentencing guidelines without a commensurate (and unintended) increase in 
incarceration. Some have argued that the criminal justice system is a “hydraulic 
system . . . like a water balloon: If you squeeze it at one decision point in the effort 
to control discretion, it will bulge at another.”264 In other words, if we demand 
charging equality, will it be more difficult to obtain sentence equality? This is the 
worry. Moving towards a state charging guidelines similar to the federal sentencing 
guidelines may actually worsen mass incarceration—in the way the federal 
guidelines have done.265  
Rather than strict guidelines, providing simple principles could help prosecutor 
charging. Some principles to consider are—do not charge more than one crime when 
one will do. Do not charge the most severe charge and consider not creating a new 
criminal record. Or before charging, always consider if an alternative exists to 
charging a crime—like referral to mental health, drug addiction support, mediation 
or other social services, options which some respondents in our study wrote that they 
would pursue. This focus would require one where a prosecutor’s job advancement 
does not rely on her increasing punishment but on creatively solving community 
problems, sometimes without a day in jail. There are certainly other principles that 
might be considered for improved prosecutor charging,266 and other solutions that 
may involve removing or drastically altering the role of prosecutors and police in 
criminal justice.267 
Instead of removing discretion with national charging guidelines, an 
independent local and state review of prosecutorial charging practices and data on 
local practices might improve uniformity and reduce severity in charging. Indeed, 
one of us has argued elsewhere that prosecutors need a constitutional check, like a 
 
263  Paul M. Secunda, Cleaning Up the Chicken Coop of Sentencing Uniformity: 
Guiding the Discretion of Federal Prosecutors Through the Use of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1267, 1272 (1997). 
264 Whitman, supra note 253, at 123. See also Daniel Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, 
The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System, 14 J. L. ECON & ORG. 256 (1998); 
MICHAEL TONRY & JOHN COFFEE, ENFORCING SENTENCING GUIDELINES; PLEA BARGAINING 
AND REVIEW MECHANISMS (1987); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal 
Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 790–91 (2006). 
265 Paul Cassell and Frank O. Bowman III, The Institutional Concerns in Sentencing 
Regimes: The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (2005) (concluding that “the federal sentencing guidelines 
system has failed” because it produces bad outcomes too often); Mauer & King, supra note 
5, 7–8 (Federal Sentencing Guidelines resulting in more people incarcerated for longer 
periods of time.); United States v. Angelos, F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1263 (D. Utah 2004), aff’d, 
433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006), (concluding that the “55-year sentence mandated by [the 
federal sentencing requirements] in this case appears to be unjust, cruel, and irrational”). 
266 See supra note 26-27. 
267 See Shima Baughman, Why Do We Fund the Police?, MEDIUM (June 10, 2020). 
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regular independent internal review.268 This could come through an internal review 
board under the purview of the governor and attorney general or an independent 
disinterested body that reviews prosecutor charging decisions and plea bargaining 
agreements. 269  A quarterly or biannual review could help with uniformity and 
severity between prosecutors in an office or within a particular region. Similar cases 
could be compared to consider charging uniformity and overall severity and 
incarceration rates in a region and be compared to jail space and community goals.270 
This would also involve educating communities where prosecutors are elected on 
these issues,271 and changing the current incentives prosecutors have to overcharge 
because their success is based on increasing punishment whenever possible. 272 
 
268  Baughman, Subconstitutional, supra note 47, at 1123 (arguing for “quarterly 
internal review procedures to determine whether individual prosecutors are meeting office 
goals.”) 
269 Jennifer Lee, supra note 58, at 1 (“Mandating the collection of various procedural 
data on matters such as arrests, prison time, and plea bargains creates a valuable metric by 
which to assess ethics and help voters make informed decisions during prosecutorial 
elections. Tracking behavior and placing prosecutors under the care of the Attorney General 
also instills a heightened sense of professional accountability. By placing the responsibility 
of creating internal discovery policies upon the attorney general, states gain the ability to 
conduct a centralized system of control and maintain uniformity and fairness in criminal 
matters. Independent prosecutorial review panels expedite the complaint process because 
panel members are able to focus exclusively on prosecutors, unlike state bar associations 
tasked with investigating and disciplining every licensed attorney in the state”); Baughman, 
Subconstitutional, supra note 47, at 1138–39. 
270 Bellin, Reassessing, supra note 56. 
271 Broad public transparency on prosecutorial charging factors might not improve 
incarceration. Some scholars argue that prosecutors should inform the public of what factors 
they consider when making charging decisions. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 
26, at 589, 622; Sawyer, supra note 17, at 621 (prosecutors feel compelled to hide their 
motivations for prosecuting from the public, “[i]t reduces the availability of information that 
voters need to make informed choices, limits the control the democratic process can exert 
over prosecutors,” and among others, “cuts short opportunities for fruitful debate over the 
best approach to criminal justice”). I agree with Barkow that the more transparency on 
charging, the larger the potential threat that elected prosecutors place pressure on line 
prosecutors to be more severe—rather than less. BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS, supra, 
note 10, at 8–9 (Elected leaders fear being labeled as soft on crime, so they aim to appear as 
tough as possible, even if there is no empirical grounding for the approaches they endorse.) 
272 Green, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 26, at 589; Leonetti, supra note 72, at 
60–5, 74–5 (proposing a doctrinal mechanism for reigning in the incentives to overcharge 
within the existing system of prosecutorial discretion).  
On the other side, others argue that prosecutors have no desire to maximize punishment. 
Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 764–
66 (2016) (as political actors, prosecutions have no inherent desire to seek maximal 
punishment consistently and “Prosecutors do not bring every case that they could win; they 
do not invariably try to maximize severity of punishment”); Richard T. Boylan, What Do 
Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
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Larger structural changes could also be considered to improve prosecutorial 
charging.273 This approach maintains prosecutor discretion while potentially leading 
to broader discussions among prosecutors on the right way to balance competing 
interests of justice to victims and society and impacts on mass incarceration. 
Improving our understanding of how prosecutors are charging nationally is 
critical to stopping the growth of mass incarceration. Prosecutors need to be made 
aware and held responsible through independent review of their collective actions. 
It unclear from our data but could be that prosecutors are routinely charging 
individuals with several crimes. It appears harsh to charge crimes in almost every 
case, even minor ones. But a prosecutor may impose these charges, knowing that 
they can be used for leverage in plea bargaining and some of them will be dropped.274 
Individual prosecutors are rewarded for winning cases, holding defendants 
accountable, and making the office “look good.” However, what is likely not 
accounted for is that often while plea negotiations are happening—where many if 
not all of these charges are dropped—an individual is most often in pretrial 
detention,275 which is the greatest contributor to jail overcrowding and adds to the 
mass incarceration problem just by sheer volume of minor cases.276 The defendant 
spends time in jail while the case is dismissed most of the time. A prosecutor starting 
with a strong bargaining position with several charges for a minor case ends up 
costing the state and a defendant for harsh charging choices.277 Without statistics 
collected on an office, regional or national basis an individual prosecutor has no idea 
what the overall effects of their individual charging decisions are. Prosecutor offices 
face no consequences for the costs of incarceration they impose and do not have to 
deal with the collateral consequences they impose on defendants—like the loss of 
job and housing that accompany a short stint in jail. 278  Simple awareness by 
prosecutor offices of these collective costs and independent review with 
accountability could lead to new thinking on prosecutor charging practices, and 
eventually a shift in mass incarceration. 
 
 
379, 379 (2005) (“[C]onviction rates do not appear to affect the careers of U.S. attorneys.”); 
Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization 
of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 261 (2000) (“demonstrating the incentives that 
create “a desire [] to pursue the most dangerous criminals and a desire [] to pursue criminals 
who will bring them private career returns”); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: 
Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 966-69 (1997) 
(deciding that prosecutors are motivated by maximizing convictions, re-election, “not-
losing,” and reputation) 
273  See e.g., Barkow, Institutional, supra note 67, at 869, and Baughman, 
Subconstitutional, supra note 47, at 1071, 1091, which both argue that major structural 
changes must be made for prosecutorial motivations and decisions to change. 
274 A few of our prosecutors indicated this exact thing in their qualitative responses. 
275 See BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK, supra note 25.  
276 See Baughman, History, supra note 23. 
277 See BAZELON, supra note 12; see PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12. 
278 See Baughman, Subconstitutional, supra note 47. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Prosecutors unknowingly contribute to mass incarceration through individual 
charging decisions. 279  Previous work argues that prosecutors increased crimes 
charged from 1980 to 2007.280 However, during the last ten to fifteen years, crime 
rates have dropped, and arrest rates have gone down. But this Article demonstrates 
that during this same time period, prosecutors have actually increased the ratio of 
criminal court filings. That is to say, police are helping decrease mass incarceration, 
but prosecutors are not doing their part—possibly because they are not aware of the 
problem. There is very little data or transparency for individual prosecutors to know 
how other prosecutors are charging nationally.  
The study relied upon here demonstrates why this trend of excessive charging 
may be a national issue. In our study with a sample of prosecutors from across the 
nation, depicting a minor assault based crime with no physical injury, respondents 
consistently charged crimes in almost every instance. Our study demonstrates the 
lowest rate of declinations ever found in a national study—demonstrating only 3% 
of prosecutors refusing to charge a crime. We also observed surprising severity and 
wild variability in charging. Indeed, prosecutors most commonly charged three 
crimes, and some charged up to 11. While less than 30% of prosecutors 
recommended jail time and 40% a fine, those who did recommend incarceration and 
fine recommendations ranged from five years to 30 days and fines from $5000 
dollars to $500. Our review of national guidelines from the Supreme Court and 
prosecutor standards demonstrate that national guidelines do not stand in the way of 
any of these decisions—and may even encourage severe charging practices.  
We do not prescribe a single solution for reducing severity or improving 
uniformity of prosecutor charging. We do not recommend removing discretion but 
do believe that collecting prosecutor charging data and requiring a regular 
independent review of prosecutorial decisions could help prosecutors consider the 
impact of their charging decisions. Our hope is that informing prosecutors of the 
scale of the charging problem and its effects on mass incarceration will lead to a 
more careful approach to prosecutorial charging nationwide.  
 
279 Even with the looming Corona virus, district attorneys are being blamed for not 
responding appropriately. One inmate said publicly to the Orleans District attorney, “‘I want 
to thank you for getting me out of the dog cage,” she said. “But, Lord, there are other things 
for you to worry about right now, instead of harassing people for petty-ass shit.”’ Sarah 
Stillman, Will the Coronavirus Make Us Rethink Mass Incarceration, THE NEW YORKER 
(May 18, 2020). Also noting “In bail hearings, when public defenders raised the threat 
of COVID-19, the district attorney’s office accused them of trying to ‘exploit’ the coronavirus 
to benefit their clients.” 
280 See BAZELON, supra note 12; see PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12. 
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